The  Public Use  Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence by Kelly, Daniel B
THE “PUBLIC USE” REQUIREMENT IN EMINENT DOMAIN LAW:
A RATIONALE BASED ON SECRET PURCHASES AND PRIVATE INFLUENCE
Daniel B. Kelly*
ABSTRACT
This article provides a rationale for understanding and interpreting the “public use”
requirement within eminent domain law.  The rationale is based on two factors.  First, 
while the government often needs the power of eminent domain to avoid the problem of 
strategic holdout, private parties are usually able to purchase property through secret 
buying agents.  The availability of these buying agents makes the use of eminent domain 
for private parties unnecessary (and indeed, undesirable).  The government, however, is 
ordinarily unable to make secret purchases because its plans are subject to democratic 
deliberation and known in advance. Second, while the use of eminent domain for 
traditional public objectives does not create a danger of corruption, the use of such 
power for private parties invites the potential for inordinate influence.  Private parties 
that directly benefit from takings can obtain a concentrated benefit and often pay little for 
acquiring properties.  These parties thus have a strong incentive to influence the eminent 
domain process for their own advantage.  In light of this analysis, the article finds that 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London and decisions in 
several other important cases are problematic.  The article concludes that the theory of 
public use based on secret purchases and private influence provides a socially desirable,
judicially administrable, and constitutionally legitimate mechanism for distinguishing 
between public and private uses and reforming the law of eminent domain.
*
 Fellow, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, & Business, Harvard Law School.  J.D., Harvard 
Law School; B.A., University of Notre Dame. (dkelly@post.harvard.edu)  I am indebted to Laura Beny, 
Steve Calindrillo, Marcus Cole, Robert Ellickson, Richard Epstein, Noah Feldman, Nicole Garnett, Mary 
Ann Glendon, Alan Morrison, Richard Posner, David Rosenberg, and Joseph Singer for their valuable 
comments and suggestions.  I would also like to thank A. Mitchell Polinsky for inviting me to deliver an 
earlier version of this paper at Stanford Law School and Steven Shavell for inviting me to deliver an earlier 
version of this paper at Harvard Law School.  A special word of thanks is due to Steven Shavell for many 
helpful comments and discussions.  I am grateful as well to the John M. Olin Center for research support.  
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................6
A. A Short History of “Public Use” .....................................................6
B.  The Overruling of Poletown ............................................................8
C. Kelo v. City of New London ..........................................................11
III. A RATIONALE FOR THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT .............................12
A. Secret Purchases ............................................................................12
1. Circumventing the Holdout Problem .......................................12
2.  Enabling Socially Desirable Transfers ....................................15
3. Distinguishing Governmental Takings ....................................19
B. Inordinate Private Influence ...........................................................20
1.  The Concentrated Benefit Problem ..........................................20
2.  The Costless Acquisition Problem ...........................................22
3.  The Resource Disparity Problem .............................................24
C. Counterarguments ..........................................................................26
1.  Positive Externalities ...............................................................26
2.  Timing Problems and Collusion ………………......................28
3.  Distrust and Resentment ......................................................... 29
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW THEORY ....................................................31
A. Kelo and Economic Development .................................................31
B.  Berman and Urban Blight ..............................................................34
C. Instrumentalities and Utilities ........................................................38
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEW THEORY AND ITS ADVANTAGES ....................
40
The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law:
A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence
© 2006 Daniel B. Kelly.  All rights reserved.
“[W]hen we come to inquire what are public uses for which the right of 
compulsory taking may be employed, and what are private uses for which the 
right is forbidden, we find no agreement, either in reasoning or conclusion.”
-UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1908)1
“Further efforts at providing a precise definition of ‘public use’ are doomed 
to fail . . . .”
-NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (2003)2
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Public Use Clause3 of the Fifth Amendment has not been interpreted in a 
manner that has been regarded as intellectually compelling, despite numerous attempts to 
discern its meaning by the courts and by legal commentators.4 The primary controversy
has been whether, or under what circumstances, the state may use the power of eminent 
domain for the benefit of a private party by deeming the private party’s use a public use.
One view holds that a taking requires either public ownership or public access.  Under 
this view, the government may utilize eminent domain for a post office, airport, or 
highway.5 A contrasting view argues that eminent domain can be justified for any private 
use so long as the taking ostensibly produces a general public benefit.  Under this view, a 
taking might be justified to enable a private party to develop real estate, build a factory, 
or construct a stadium or casino.6
1
 Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908).
2 2A P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. rev. 2003, J. Sackman ed.) § 7.02[7] [hereinafter NICHOLS]. 
3 U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”).  
The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the public use requirement against the states.  See Chicago B. & 
Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  Forty-nine state constitutions have similar public use clauses.
4 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 997, 997 (1999) (concluding that “Supreme Court decisions over the last three-quarters of a 
century have turned the words of the Takings Clause into a secret code that only a momentary majority of 
the Court is able to understand”); Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance 
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 605-06 (1949) [hereinafter Requiem] (describing a “massive body of case law, 
irreconcilable in its inconsistency, confusing it its detail and defiant of all attempts at classification”).
5 See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876) (upholding condemnations for post offices); Kansas 
City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App. 1998) (upholding condemnations for airport); Arnold v. Covington 
& Cincinnati Bridge Co., 1 Duv. 372 (Ky. 1864) (upholding condemnations for highways).
6 See, e.g., City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003) 
(upholding condemnations for casino consortium); Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,  646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982) 
(upholding condemnation of sports franchise); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding condemnations for General Motors factory); Courtesy Sandwich 
Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963) (upholding condemnations for World 
Trade Center).
2Concurring predominantly with this latter view, the United States Supreme Court, 
as well as lower federal and state courts, have found a broad spectrum of private projects 
consistent with the public use requirement, thereby allowing private developers to benefit 
from eminent domain.7 As a result, the number of takings for private parties has
increased dramatically in recent years.8 In Riviera Beach, Florida, for example, a $1.25 
billion redevelopment project may demolish 1,700 homes and 300 businesses and 
displace 5,100 people.9  In San Jose, California, one-tenth of the city’s total area, which 
includes one-third of its population, is currently subject to condemnation.10 And in a
smaller (but possibly more extreme) example, one Florida family, already outraged that 
its home was being condemned to build a golf course, was informed that the home—
instead of being demolished—would be converted into the golf course manager’s new 
living quarters, which the court upheld as a public necessity.11
While many commentators therefore agree that the current takings doctrine can be 
used to justify “virtually any exercise of the eminent domain power,”12 two recent 
cases—the Michigan Supreme Court’s overruling of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Detroit13 and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London14—have necessitated a reexamination of this issue.  In light of these cases, this 
article analyzes the meaning that ought to be given the public use requirement in order to 
advance social welfare.  The article develops a judicially administrable method of 
interpreting public use based on two important yet previously underappreciated factors: 
namely, that private parties but not the government can ordinarily assemble property 
using secret buying agents—meaning that private parties, unlike the government, usually 
do not need the power of eminent domain to overcome the problem of strategic holdout; 
and that takings for private projects invite the potential for inordinate private influence as 
private parties seek to exploit the eminent domain process for their own advantage.
7 See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (“[W]here the exercise of 
eminent domain is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”) (emphasis added); Gamble v. Eau Claire 
County, 5 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We can find no case in the last half century where a taking was 
squarely held to be for a private use.”).
8 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT 
EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003) (documenting over 10,000 actual or threatened cases 
of private takings between 1998 and 2003).
9 See Scott McCabe, Residents Vow to Fight Riviera Plan, THE PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 17, 2001, at 1B; 
Thomas R. Collins, Many Businesses Feeling Put Out By Riviera Plans, THE PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 6, 
2003, at 1A.  
10 See Evans v. City of San Jose, No. H026802, 2004 WL 2542805, at *3 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. July 22, 
2004); see also BERLINER, supra note 8, at 3.
11 See Zamecnik v. Palm Beach County, 768 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. App. 2000) (per curiam); see also Marc 
Caputo, County to Seize Couple’s Home So Golf Manager Can Have It, THE PALM BEACH POST, May 6, 
2000, at 1A. 
12
 Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207, 212-13 (2004); 
see also Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can the Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the 
Erosion of the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 565-66 (2002) (concluding that 
“evolution of the public use requirement of the eminent domain power virtually obliterated any limitation 
on the government”).  
13 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 
2004).
14
 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
3The usual justification for allowing private parties to benefit from the use of 
eminent domain is the same as that for the government: this power may be needed to 
overcome the “holdout” problem caused by strategically-acting sellers if property had to 
be purchased.15 In the absence of eminent domain, a buyer would confront a holdout
problem in cases involving the assembly of multiple properties for a single project.  Any 
potential seller, knowing that her single property is necessary for the entire project, could
“hold out” in order to obtain an inflated price.16  This strategic behavior could prevent the 
transaction (and consequently, the entire project) from occurring.17 According to this
conventional wisdom, private parties seeking to assemble multiple properties are just as 
afflicted by the holdout problem as the government and thus just as much in need of the 
power of eminent domain to overcome the problem.
In this article, however, I explain that takings for the benefit of private parties are 
usually unnecessary—even if the private project potentially also has a public benefit—
because private parties do not in fact face the holdout problem.  Specifically, private 
parties can avoid the holdout problem using secret buying agents, which provide an 
alternative and (as will be demonstrated) socially superior mechanism for effecting 
transfers of property.  In contrast, the nature of public scrutiny and the transparency of 
democratic deliberation tend to prevent the state from using secret buying agents to 
facilitate traditional public takings.  
As a result, the takings power—while necessary for the state—is ordinarily 
unnecessary for private parties who can obtain and assemble property through buying
agents. Perhaps surprisingly, this fundamental point has not been properly appreciated.  
Although some commentators and courts have noted in passing that private parties 
sometimes employ buying agents,18 these commentators have not recognized the 
importance of this stratagem and, significantly, have not noticed that, because 
government usually cannot employ this technique, secret purchases provide a mechanism
for distinguishing between public and private uses.
While the use of secret buying agents may at first seem implausible, private 
parties can (and indeed, already do) use buying agents to overcome the holdout problem 
and assemble property.  Harvard University, for example, working through a real estate 
15 See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and The Single Owners: One More Salute to Ronald 
Coase, 36 J. L. & E. 553, 572 (1993) (stating that eminent domain is used “typically to prevent holdouts”); 
Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1570 (1986) 
(book review) (pointing out that eminent domain “traditionally has been employed to promote a more 
efficient allocation of resources by overcoming holdouts and free riders”); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 41-42 (2d ed. 1977) (maintaining that eminent domain power is justified in economic 
terms only in the context of certain holdout situations); see also infra notes 87-88 (citing cases).
16 See Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain and Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be Abolished 
and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 468 (2003) (describing the classic 
holdout problem if an assembly project becomes public knowledge); EUGENE SILBERBERG, PRINCIPLES OF 
MICROECONOMICS 288 (2d ed. 1999) (same).
17 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25 (2004) (“[T]he problem 
of an impasse in bargaining may become severe when there are many private owners who own parcels and 
when, if any one of them does not sell, the whole project would be seriously affected or halted.”).
18 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81 (1986) (pointing 
out that “real estate developers and others are frequently able to assemble such parcels by using buying 
agents, option agreements, straw transactions, and the like”); POSNER, supra note 15, at 43-44 (noting that 
shopping center developers and others can overcome holdout problems without using eminent domain).
4development company, used secret agents to avoid strategic sellers and purchase fourteen
parcels of land for $88 million.19 Similarly, Disney has used buying agents in Orlando, 
Florida and Manassas, Virginia to assemble thousands of acres for its theme parks.20 One 
circuit court has pointed out that, among shopping center developers and real estate 
purchasers, the use of these agents is a “common arms-length business practice.”21  And 
even the U.S. Supreme Court recently recognized that “private developers can use 
numerous techniques, including secret negotiations or precommitment strategies, to 
overcome holdout problems and assemble lands for genuinely profitable projects.”22
The use of eminent domain for private parties, however, is not only unnecessary 
but actually socially undesirable because eminent domain (unlike acquisitions through 
secret purchases) sometimes leads to inefficient transfers.  Because there is no 
mechanism for determining how much existing owners actually (i.e., subjectively) value 
their property, courts routinely ignore actual value, and instead rely on the “fair market 
value” of damages to determine “just compensation” for the condemnee’s loss.  However, 
because market value neither calculates nor compensates a taking’s full costs (i.e., the 
actual value to the existing owners), a socially undesirable transfer may occur whenever 
the existing owners’ subjective value deviates from the court-determined objective value.
As a result, eminent domain may force a transfer where the existing owners value the 
land more than the private assembler.23
Unlike eminent domain, secret buying agents facilitate transfers if and only if the 
transfer is socially desirable.  Buying agents thereby eliminate the risk of erroneous 
condemnations.  Voluntary exchange using buying agents allows the existing owners’ 
subjective value to be taken into account while preventing existing owners from 
strategically inflating that value.  As a result, a transfer will occur only if the value to the 
assembler is greater than the actual value to the existing owners.  Requiring voluntary 
transactions through secret purchases thus enables mutually beneficial transactions to 
occur, while preventing the socially undesirable transactions that eminent domain 
sometimes allows.  Buying agents therefore provide not only an alternative but also a 
superior mechanism to eminent domain for private transfers by combining the primary 
advantage of eminent domain (namely, overcoming bargaining problems) with the 
primary advantage of consensual exchange (namely, ensuring that transfers are socially 
desirable).  
19 See Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases of 52 Acres Worth $88 Million in 
Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A1 (explaining that Harvard bought land “without revealing its 
identity to the sellers, residents, local politicians, or city officials because property owners would have 
drastically inflated the prices if they knew Harvard was the buyer”).
20 See Tim O’Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse; Lawyers Ran Dummy Corporations, 
Bought Real Estate for Disney, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 10, 1994, at 2 (describing “Disney’s 
elaborate scheme to hide its identity as it amassed about 3,000 acres for a proposed theme park in Northern 
Virginia”); Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers To Amass Land Stage for Kingdom, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K2 (explaining how, “[w]orking under a strict cloak of secrecy, real 
estate agents who didn’t know the identity of their client began making offers to landowners”).
21
 Westgate Village Shopping Center v. Lion Dry Goods Co., 21 F.3d 429 (Table), 1994 WL 108959, at 
*7 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that using secret buying agents to develop shopping centers is “a common 
arms-length business practice that has to do with keeping real estate prices from escalating”).
22
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2668 n.24 (2005).
23 See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
5The use of eminent domain for private parties should also be disfavored for a 
second reason: private takings allow inordinate private influence to distort the eminent 
domain process.  In a taking primarily for a private benefit (e.g., the assembly of land for 
a real estate development), the single beneficiary of the taking (the developer) can obtain 
a relatively concentrated benefit.  By contrast, in a taking primarily for public benefit 
(e.g., the acquisition of land for a new highway), the beneficiaries of the taking (the 
future users of the road) are more numerous and can only obtain a relatively dispersed 
benefit.  As a result, because they typically obtain a substantial benefit, private parties 
that would directly benefit from takings have a stronger incentive than the general public 
to subvert the takings power for their own advantage. A private taking thus involves a 
greater potential for inordinate private influence than a traditional public taking.
Using eminent domain for private parties also tends to encourage two additional
types of inordinate influence.  First, private parties that directly benefit from the state’s 
use of eminent domain are usually not required to reimburse the state for the cost of the 
takings.  Because they can use eminent domain to acquire land costlessly for their own
objectives, these private actors have an incentive to overutilize eminent domain and 
engage in excessive takings.  Second, potential private beneficiaries can also exploit 
disparities in legal and financial resources to obtain the state’s condemnation authority.  
Indeed, while the primary beneficiaries of private takings tend to be real-estate 
developers, casino consortia, and large national or multi-national corporations, the 
primary victims of these takings tend to be the economically disadvantaged, the elderly, 
and racial and ethnic minorities.24 Hence, because of the increased potential for
inordinate private influence, as well as the superiority of secret buying agents, eminent 
domain should generally not be used on behalf of private parties.
Finally, this article analyzes several potential counterarguments to the foregoing 
rationale for the public use requirement.  The primary objection involves the possibility 
of positive externalities—i.e., benefits to the community that parties to the transaction
cannot internalize.25 In certain situations where a significant externality exists, a 
project’s private benefit may not be substantial enough to induce private parties to 
assemble the property even though the externality makes the project socially desirable.  
While a common solution to this type of externality is the use of a public subsidy,26 a 
subsidy may not be feasible ex ante while maintaining the anonymity of secret buying 
agents.  However, such a subsidy may be feasible ex post to provide private parties with 
the sufficient ex ante incentive to undertake the project through secret purchases.  This 
article addresses positive externalities (as well as several other counterarguments
regarding timing problems, collusion, distrust and resentment) and analyzes under what 
circumstances (if any) these objections would alter the preceding analysis.
Overall, however, this article suggests that the current public use test, focusing as 
it does on the character of the use, is misconceived because takings for private parties are 
unnecessary (and indeed, often socially undesirable).  The article thus reexamines the 
24 See infra  notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
25
 On externalities, see generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 751 
(15th ed. 1995); THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 146 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).
26 See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (1932); A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND 
WELFARE 148-71 (1912).  For a recent analysis, see Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law 
Enforcement, 36 J.L & ECON. 255 (1993).
6public use requirement and articulates a new theory based on secret purchases and private 
influence.  Part II reviews the constitutional framework, including two recent 
developments: the overruling of Poletown and the holding in Kelo.  Part III, which 
contains the heart of the economic analysis, examines secret buying agents and inordinate 
private influence, as well as several potential counterarguments.  Part IV applies this 
economic analysis to the two most common situations: the assembly of land for economic 
development, illustrated using Kelo, and the elimination of urban blight, illustrated using
Berman v. Parker. Part V concludes that this new rationale for the public use
requirement is not only socially desirable, judicially administrable, and constitutionally 
legitimate but also superior to the status quo as a mechanism for distinguishing between 
public and private uses in both legislative and judicial decisionmaking.
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A.  A Short History of “Public Use”
The government’s sovereign authority to seize property for “public use” if it
provides “just compensation” originated at English common law and appeared in 
America as early as the seventeenth century.27 In colonial America, government officials
invoked the power of eminent domain rather infrequently, due in part to the relatively 
limited number of uses for eminent domain at the time.28 However, James Madison, who 
drafted the original language of the Public Use Clause, feared that the government’s 
power to take property, if left unrestricted, could jeopardize private property rights.29
As a result, the drafters of the Bill of Rights adopted Madison’s proposal as part of the
Fifth Amendment, which limits the eminent domain power to the taking of “private 
property . . . for public use.”30
Federal courts did not decide a case involving the federal government’s use of 
eminent domain until 1875.31  But in several cases in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court held that takings for private parties with 
incidental public benefits violated the Public Use or Due Process Clause.32   Thomas 
27 See NICHOLS §7.01[3] (“The principle that private property may be taken for public uses can be traced 
back to English common law where it was presumed that the king ultimately held the title to all the land.  
This meant that if the king needed the property, he was permitted to take it.”) (citations omitted).
28 See Requiem, supra note 4, at 600 (“Prior to the adoption of the federal and early state constitutions, 
governments rarely needed privately owned land.”).
29 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 314-15 (1996) (noting that Madison’s “concern about the security of private rights was 
rooted in a palpable fear that economic legislation was jeopardizing fundamental rights of property” and 
that “by 1787 a decade of state legislation had enabled Madison to perceive how economic and financial 
issues could forge broad coalitions across society, which could then actively manipulate the legislature to 
secure their desired ends”).
30 U.S. Const. amend. V.
31 See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
32 See, e.g., Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905) (“[W]e do not . . . approv[e] of the broad 
proposition that private party may be taken in all cases where the taking may promote the public interest 
and tend to develop the natural resources of the State.”); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 164 
U.S. 403 (1896) (“The taking by a State of the private property of one person or corporation, without the 
owner’s consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law . . . .”).
7Cooley, one of the leading constitutional jurists of the nineteenth century, argued that 
“the due protection of the rights of private property will preclude the government from 
seizing it in the hands of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds of 
public benefit to spring from a more profitable use to which the latter will devote it.”33
Overall, the view of most nineteenth century jurists, as well as early Supreme Court 
decisions, was that the use of eminent domain for these purposes violated the Public Use 
Clause.34
However, due in part to the unprecedented technological innovation during the 
second half of the nineteenth century, private corporations increasingly began to seek 
(and sometimes obtain) the power to condemn property for their own objectives.35 As a 
result, the Supreme Court, led by Justice Holmes, expanded the definition of public use 
and repudiated the “use by the public” test.36  The Court interpreted the Public Use 
Clause to require only that the legislature posit a conceivable “public purpose.”37 At the 
same time, the Court announced that legislative determinations of public use should 
receive significant deference from the judiciary.38 Indeed, following the Second World 
War, the Supreme Court abandoned almost any judicial limitation on the use of eminent 
domain by suggesting that a legislative determination of public use foreclosed judicial 
review.39
Then, in the seminal case of Berman v. Parker,40 the Court reviewed a challenge 
to the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act.41 The Act
targeted blighted areas in the southwest portion of the nation’s Capitol.42  The appellants, 
however, owned and operated a department store that was not blighted and that was “not 
33 THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 654 (1868).
34 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 178 
(1985) (“The nineteenth century view, abstractly considered, was that it was a perversion of the public use 
doctrine to acquire land by condemnation for these purposes.”).
35 See William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants 
Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 930 (2004) (“As new 
technologies changed modes of transportation and production, private firms were often lent the right of 
eminent domain.”) (citing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 75-78 (1992)).
36
 See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916) 
(Holmes, J.) (concluding that “[t]he inadequacy of the use by the general public as a universal test is 
established”); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (Holmes, J.) (stating that 
earlier cases have “recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test” (citing Clark, 
198 U.S. at 369).
37 See Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co., 240 U.S. at 32 (equating “public use” with “public 
purpose”); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161 (1896) (noting that eminent domain 
could be conferred if “property . . . was to be taken for a public purpose”).
38 See Old Dominion v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (Holmes, J.) (emphasizing that when 
“Congress has declared the purpose to be a public use . . . [i]ts decision is entitled to deference until it is 
shown to involve an impossibility.”); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923) (asserting that 
power of appropriating private property for public use “resides in the Legislature” and is “not a judicial 
question”).
39 See United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1946) (stating 
that “it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a public use and that the agency 
authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority”).
40
 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41
 60 Stat. 790, D.C. Code 1951 §§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1945).
42 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
8used as a dwelling or place of habitation.”43 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Douglas upheld the condemnation and stated that “[s]ubject to specific constitutional 
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in 
terms well-nigh conclusive.”44 The holding of Berman confirmed the Court’s expansive 
definition of public use and its Holmesian deference to legislative determinations.45
Thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,46 the Court considered 
Hawaii’s efforts to remedy the islands’ concentrated land ownership.  Hawaii permitted 
tenants to request governmental condemnations of their landlord’s property and then 
allowed these tenants to purchase the property for a nominal fee.47  Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor upheld the condemnations and reiterated that the 
Court “will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes 
a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”48 Concluding
that the public use requirement is “coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police 
powers,”49 the Court seemed to imply, as many commentators observed, that review of 
legislative determinations of public use requires only minimal judicial scrutiny under the 
rational basis standard (which applies to all other economic legislation).50 The Court’s 
deferential approach in Midkiff signaled that almost any governmental taking, even those 
involving private transfers, would qualify as a legitimate public use.51
B.  The Overruling of Poletown
Most state courts, like the earliest federal decisions, originally favored the narrow 
definition of public use.  These state courts prohibited compulsory transfers between 
43 Id. at 31.
44 Id. at 32.
45 See GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE 
REGULATORY STATE’S ACQUISITION, USE AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 44 (1998) (asserting that 
in Berman the Supreme Court effectively “read this clause out of the Constitution”); James Geoffrey 
Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (1985) 
(pointing out that “the Berman Court not only gave an unlimited meaning to public use, it also drew a very 
limited role for courts reviewing whether such actions were taken in the public welfare”).
46
 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
47 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481 (2001) (describing 
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967).
48 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
49 Id. at 244.
50 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 47, at 480 (2001) (“[T]he contemporary Court has extended the 
same deference toward legislative determinations of what constitutes ‘public use’ as it now does under 
economic due process scrutiny.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 891 
(1987) (“[T]he public use requirement has been rendered effectively unenforceable, much like the 
rationality requirement of the due process clause post-Lochner.”); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 n. 5 (1977) (“[A]ny state purpose otherwise constitutional should 
qualify as sufficiently ‘public’ to justify a taking.”).
51 See Thomas J. Loyne, Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem for the Public Use 
Limitation on Eminent Domain?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 388 (1985) (“The decision [in Midkiff] almost 
ensures that all government takings will be upheld.”); Mark C. Landry, Note, The Public Use Requirement 
in Eminent Domain—A Requiem, 60 TUL. L. REV. 419, 430 (1985) (“Justice O’Connor . . . has so narrowed 
the scope of judicial review that overturning a legislatively authorized taking may be logically and 
practically impossible.”).
9private parties even if they potentially included an incidental public benefit.52 However, 
certain state courts increasingly began to follow the Supreme Court’s approach of
defining public use as any public purpose and deferring to legislative determinations of 
public use.53 In the wake of Berman, for example, many state courts upheld the use of 
eminent domain for private parties for a variety of urban renewal programs involving the 
elimination of blight.54 Subsequently, many state courts expanded the definition of 
public use to include promoting economic development even in the absence of blight.55
As a culmination of these precedents, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of 
Detroit came to be the most influential state case defining public use in the modern era.56
In Poletown, the city of Detroit utilized its eminent domain power to condemn an entire 
neighborhood for the construction of a new General Motors manufacturing plant.57 The 
affected homeowners argued that the takings constituted an unconstitutional private use
because the direct and primary beneficiary of the taking was General Motors.  The 
Michigan Supreme Court, however, upheld the condemnations by concluding that “public 
use” and “public purpose” could be used interchangeably.58 The Court concluded that, 
“even though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit,” a municipality’s use 
of eminent domain to alleviate unemployment and revitalize the local economy
constitutes two “essential public purposes.” 59
Relying on Poletown, many state courts interpreted their own state constitutions 
in a similar manner and equated public use with public purpose.60  As a result, under most 
52 See Eric R. Claeys, Public Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 
901-05 (2004) (discussing the “public use” doctrine in the nineteenth century); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 
125 S.Ct. 2655, 2681-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting early state court decisions). But see Philip 
Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REV. 615, 619-24 
(1940) (discussing early state cases broadly defining “public use”).
53 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at __, 125 S.Ct. at 2662 (“[W]hile many state courts in the mid-19th century 
endorsed ‘use by the public’ as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over 
time.”); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 1182 (2002) 
(“[M]ost state supreme courts have interpreted their state constitutions in a manner consistent with the 
federal interpretation . . .”).
54 See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Chertkoff, 441 A.2d 1044, 1055 (Md. 1982) (relying on Berman to 
conclude “urban renewal ordinance may lawfully command the condemnation of private industrial property 
for public use in pursuance of a genuine urban renewal plan”).
55 See, e.g., Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So.2d 962, 973 (La. App. 2001) (relying on Berman
and Midkiff to conclude that “economic development, in the form of a convention center and headquarters 
hotel, satisfies the public purposes and public necessity requirement of [the state constitution]”), cert. 
denied, 805 So.2d 209 (La. 2002); People ex rel. City of Urban v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915, 920-21 (Ill. 1977) 
(finding that the public purpose “can no longer be restricted to areas where crime, vacancy, or physical 
decay produce undesirable living conditions or imperil public health” but also extends to “[s]timulation of 
commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation”).  
56 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
57 See NICHOLS § 7.06[7][c][iv] (tabulating that “[o]ver 465 acres, 3,500 people, and 1,176 buildings, 
including 144 businesses, 3 schools, 16 churches, and 1 cemetery were taken by the City of Detroit for a 
cost exceeding $ 200 million in order to provide land for a new General Motors facility”).
58 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457 (noting that the “terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan 
statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit”) (citations omitted).  
59 Id. at 459.
60 See, e.g., Jamestown v. Leevers, 552 N.W.2d 365, 369, 372-74 (N.D. 1996) (discussing Poletown and 
concluding that “the stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation . . . are 
objectives satisfying the public use and purpose requirement”); City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 
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state constitutions, as well as the U.S. Constitution,61 almost any conceivable justification 
seemed to constitute a public use even if a private party received the primary benefit.62
However, unlike the deferential approach of Poletown and its progeny, several state
courts recently posited a less deferential interpretation of public use63 and reaffirmed the 
distinction between public use and public purpose.64 As a result, an opportunity arose to 
reconsider Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.65
Characterizing Poletown as a “radical departure from fundamental constitutional 
principles,” the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock unanimously rejected the notion 
that “a private entity’s pursuit of profit was a ‘public use’ . . . simply because one entity’s 
profit maximization contributed to the health of the general economy.”66 The Court thus 
held that condemnations for a 1,300-acre business park,67 which would be privately 
owned and controlled, were unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution.  The 
Hathcock Court noted that Poletown’s economic-benefit rationale would “validate 
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity” 
because “[e]very business, every productive unit in society does . . . contribute in some 
way to the commonweal.”68 Because Poletown had provided the rationale for many state 
decisions, its overruling signaled a potential shift in eminent domain jurisprudence.69
763 (Minn. 1986) (citing Poletown and concluding that “revitalization of deteriorating urban areas and the 
alleviation of unemployment are certainly public goals”).
61 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
62 See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349, 1354 (1982) (“[T]he arguments deployed [in Poletown] in support of the publicness of this venture 
could be deployed in support of virtually any venture imaginable . . . .”); Susan Crabtree, Note, Public Use 
in Eminent Domain: Are There Limits After Oakland Raiders and Poletown?, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 82, 103 
(1983) (“Equating mere public benefit with public use has effectively destroyed public use as a restraint on 
eminent domain.”).
63 See Ga. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (“[P]ower of eminent 
domain cannot be used to accomplish a project simply because it will benefit the public.”); Southwestern 
Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Environmental, LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (“[T]o constitute a public use, 
something more than a mere benefit to the public must flow from the contemplated improvement.”) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Mfg. Housing Comm. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 196 (Wash. 
2000) (en banc) (“[T]he use under consideration must be either a use by the public, or by some agency 
which is quasi public, and not simply a use which may incidentally or indirectly promote the public interest 
or general prosperity of the state.”).
64 See Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 586 S.E.2d at 856 (“‘public purpose’ discussed in [tax] cases is not the same 
as a ‘public use’”); Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 8 (“a distinction  still exists and is essential 
to this case”); Mfg. Housing Comm., 13 P.3d at 189 (“these terms are not synonymous”).
65
  684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
66 Id. at 786-87.
67 See id. at 769-70.
68 Id.; see also id. (characterizing private economic development as a public use would “render impotent 
our constitutional limitations on the government’s power of eminent domain”).
69 See Mary Massaron Ross, Public Use: Does County of Wayne v. Hathcock Signal a Revival of the 
Public Use Limit to the Taking of Private Property?, 37 URB. LAW. 243, 247-48 (2005) (asserting that “the 
recent decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock reflects a trend toward increased review of governmental 
takings when the property is to be given over to private use”); NICHOLS § 7.06[28] (noting that “the 
reversal of the Poletown decision may signal a trend towards heightened scrutiny of what constitutes a 
‘public use’”).
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C.  Kelo v. City of New London
The opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to reexamine the public use
requirement came in Kelo v. City of New London.70 In Kelo, New London delegated its 
eminent domain authority to a private economic development corporation charged with 
revitalizing the downtown and waterfront areas of the city. The development corporation
decided to remove over ninety existing homes and small businesses in order to replace 
them with privately-owned office buildings and a riverfront hotel that would complement 
a new Pfizer global research facility.  After seven property owners refused to sell, the 
development corporation took title to the land through eminent domain.  City authorities 
argued that the condemnations were justified because the city had endured three decades 
of economic decline, including the recent loss of 1,900 government jobs, and had no 
other viable options for increasing its tax base to help pay for schools and services.71
Writing for the Court in a five-to-four decision, Justice Stevens held that the city’s 
use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private owner to another for the 
purpose of economic development constituted a legitimate public use under the Fifth 
Amendment.72 The Court based its conclusion on two lines of cases.  First, relying on 
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,73 the Court continued to define public use 
broadly by equating public use with public purpose.74  Second, relying on Berman and 
Midkiff, the Court continued to defer to legislative determinations of public use.75 The 
Court, quoting Midkiff, reiterated that “[w]hen the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and 
its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom 
of takings—no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic 
legislation—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”76 As a result, the Court 
concluded that the potential for increased jobs and tax revenue incidental to private 
development satisfied the public use requirement.77
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested that his agreement with the 
majority in this case did not “foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of 
review . . . might be appropriate” for private transfers with a higher “risk of undetected 
impermissible favoritism of private parties.”78  However, Justice Kennedy concluded that 
this case did not entail the “impermissible favoritism of private parties” because the 
primary motivation of these takings was not for the private benefit of Pfizer and because 
the condemnations were part of a “comprehensive development plan.”79
70
 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
71 See id. at 2658-60.
72 See id. at 2665 (concluding that that “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long 
accepted function of government.”).
73
 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
74 See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. at 2663 (concluding that “[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined 
that concept broadly”).
75 See id. (describing the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this 
field”).
76 Id. (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242).
77 See id. at 2665 (concluding that “an economic development plan that [the City] believes will provide 
appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased tax 
revenue . . . unquestionably serves a public purpose”).
78 Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79 Id.
12
In contrast, in two dissenting opinions, Justices O’Connor and Thomas argued 
that, under the majority’s interpretation, almost any private property is now vulnerable to 
the use of eminent domain for a more productive private project.80 Justice O’Connor (on 
behalf of four dissenters) contended that, while previous decisions such as Berman had 
focused on some “harmful property use,” the majority had expanded the meaning of 
public use.81  She noted that, under the majority’s interpretation, the state could now
transfer property from one private use to another “so long as the new use is predicted to 
generate some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more 
jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.”82 Similarly, Justice Thomas argued that the 
majority’s opinion provided no principled line for judicial decisionmaking.83
Justice Stevens defended the Court’s holding by asserting that the Public Use 
Clause retained meaning.  He noted that “transferring citizen A’s property to citizen B for 
the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay 
more taxes . . . would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot.” 84  The 
Court, however, did not provide any standard for defining public use or distinguishing 
between purported public uses (as in Kelo) and potential private uses (as in the 
hypothetical transfer from citizen A to citizen B).85
III.  A RATIONALE FOR THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT
A.  Secret Purchases
1.  Circumventing the Holdout Problem
According to the conventional justification for eminent domain, private parties, as 
well as the government, need this power to overcome the holdout problem among 
strategically-acting sellers.86 This insight regarding the holdout problem was widely 
recognized even prior to the modern law-and-economics movement.87  Contemporary 
80 See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Under the banner of economic 
development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, 
so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems 
more beneficial to the public—in the process.”); id. at  2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If such ‘economic 
development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause 
from our Constitution . . . .”).
81 Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
83 See id. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting ) (arguing that the majority’s application of Berman and Midkiff
is “further proof that the ‘public purpose’ standard is not susceptible of principled application”).
84 Id. at 2666-67 & n.17 (citing 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 
2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
85 See id. at 2667 (arguing that “the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if and 
when they arise” and “do not warrant the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use”).
86 See supra note 15.
87 See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876) (“If the right to acquire property for such uses 
may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property-holders to sell, . . . the constitutional grants of 
power may be rendered nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon . . . that 
of a private citizen.”); Everett W. Cox Co. v. State Highway Commission, 133 A. 419, 513 (N.J. 1926) (“In 
order to effect the purpose of the act for the building of state highways, the exercise of the power of 
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courts also have identified the holdout problem as the primary justification for the state’s 
use of eminent domain.88
The holdout problem may occur in cases involving the assembly of multiple
properties because of the strategic behavior of potential sellers.  The existing owners, 
knowing that their individual properties are each necessary for the assembler to complete 
the entire project, can “hold out” in order to obtain a higher price. According to one 
commentator:
Without an exercise of eminent domain, . . . [e]ach owner would have the 
power to hold out, should he choose to exercise it.  If even a few owners 
held out, others might do the same.  In this way, assembly of the needed 
parcels could become prohibitively expensive; in the end, the costs might 
well exceed the project’s potential gains.89
Indeed, this type of strategic behavior among sellers could prevent the entire project from 
occurring. 90 The primary advantage of eminent domain, therefore, is the state’s ability to
avoid these holdout problems and simply appropriate property.91
Most commentators and courts have assumed that this holdout rationale applies 
equally to both takings for the government and takings for private parties.92 However, 
takings for private parties are usually unnecessary because private parties do not face the 
holdout problem.  Specifically, private parties can avoid the holdout problem by 
employing secret buying agents, which provide not only an alternative but also a superior 
eminent domain is absolutely necessary.  If this were not the law, then a single individual could hold up a 
state project.”).
88 See, e.g., Diginet, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 958 F.2d 1388, 1400 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that “hold-up 
potential is the principal argument for investing right of way companies with the power of eminent 
domain”); Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (“Eminent domain can . . . be 
an effective tool against free-riders who hold-out for exorbitant prices when private developers are 
attempting to assemble parcels for public places . . . .”); Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress 
Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (same).  Justice Souter conveyed 
essentially the same point during oral argument in Kelo v. City of New London.  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 15, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-108.pdf (“[T]he rationale for this 
is essentially the rationale for the railroads, for the public utility line condemnations, and so on: there isn’t 
another practical way to do it.”).
89
 Merrill, supra note 18, at 74-75.
90 See Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 474 (1976) 
(“Consolidation of many contiguous but separately owned parcels of land under one owner supposedly 
creates a holdout problem, with each seller having an incentive to hold out to be the last to settle and 
capture any rent accruing to the assembly.”).
91 See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 126 (“[T]he problems in bargaining that can prevent or delay 
consummation of purchase of property are avoided when the state can appropriate property.  If the state 
wants to assemble land to build a road, it can simply take the land; it need not bargain with the many 
owners to acquire the land and face delay or unwillingness to sell.  This is a primary advantage of the use 
of eminent domain over acquisition by purchase.”).
92 See, e.g., Richard Posner, “The Kelo Case, Public Use, and Eminent Domain,” The Becker-Posner 
Blog, available at http://becker-posner-blog.com/ (June 26, 2005) (“[T]he rationale for eminent domain is 
unrelated to whether the party exercising the eminent domain power is the government or a private firm.”).
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mechanism for enabling socially desirable transfers.93  As a result, private parties do not 
need the state’s power of eminent domain.94
Private parties—including not only Harvard and Disney but also smaller urban 
developers—already utilize buying agents on a regular basis.  Harvard University, 
working through a real estate development company, used secret buying agents to 
purchase fourteen separate parcels for $88 million.95 One Harvard official, arguing that it 
is normal for nonprofit organizations to conceal their role in real estate transactions to 
prevent excessively high prices, stated that “[w]e were really driven by the need to get 
these properties at fair market value’ and avoid ‘overly inflated acquisition costs.’”96 The 
University pointed out that “the use of an intermediary is a common practice in real estate 
deals.”97
Likewise, Disney used secret agents in Orlando, Florida and Manassas, Virginia 
to avoid the holdout problem and assemble thousands of acres for its theme parks.98  In 
Orlando, buying agents “quietly negotiated one deal after another—sometimes lining up 
contracts to buy huge tracts for little more than $100 an acre.”99  Similarly, in Manassas, 
Disney “amassed about 3,000 acres for a proposed theme park in Northern Virginia” by 
“[c]reating a network of dummy companies that included agents from two other law 
firms” and “conclud[ing] as secretly as possible 11 separate deals, ranging in size from 
one acre to 1,800 acres.”100  Disney’s overriding concern in using secret agents was to 
overcome potential strategic behavior among sellers.101
Moreover, several courts have pointed out that the use of secret buying agents is a 
“common arms-length business practice” among shopping center developers and other 
real estate purchasers.102  Indeed, in overruling Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court 
93 See Munch, supra note 90, 479 (explaining that “[i]f holdout behavior is anticipated” private parties 
will incur “[e]xpenditure[s] on devices to circumvent or eliminate the incentive to hold out . . . includ[ing] 
concealment of the identity of the buyer, the purpose and extent of the planned assembly and prices paid for 
parcels, and the use of brokers”).
94 Cf. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 750 (1986) (“The law of eminent domain often reflects this anti-holdout rationale by 
confining the power to situations where holdout is a genuine threat.”).
95 See Marcella Bombardieri, Summers Boost Allston Plan; Harvard President Says Growth is Key, 
BOSTON GLOBE, October 22, 2003, at A1; Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases 
of 52 Acres Worth $88 Million in Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A1.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Alvin A. Arnold, Development: How the Site Assembler Operates, MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE 
EXECUTIVES REPORT, Feb. 15, 1995, at 6 (describing Disney’s assembly of land in Orlando as a “classic 
example”); David S. Hilzenrath, Disney’s Land of Make Believe: Acquisition Agent Used Ruse to Prevent 
Real Estate Speculation, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A1 (detailing Disney’s “stealth approach”).
99
 Mark Andrews, Disney Assembled Cast of Buyers To Amass Land Stage for Kingdom, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at K2.
100
 Tim O’Reiley, Playing Secret Agent for Mickey Mouse; Lawyers Ran Dummy Corporations, Bought 
Real Estate for Disney, LEGAL TIMES (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 10, 1994, at 2.
101 Indeed, the legal director for Walt Disney Co. noted that, “[i]f people think it is Disney, then the price 
goes up.  Or if people think there is an assemblage of land, that will drive up the price as well.”  Id.
102
 Westgate Village Shopping Center v. Lion Dry Goods Co., 21 F.3d 429 (Table), 1994 WL 108959, 
No. 93-3760, at 7 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that the use of secret buying agents in development plans for 
shopping centers is “a common arms-length business practice that has to do with keeping real estate prices 
from escalating”).
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noted that “the landscape of our country is flecked with shopping centers, office parks, 
clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and commerce” which did not “require[] 
the exercise of eminent domain or any other form of collective public action for their 
formation.”103  The Court described how shopping centers and other large-scale 
commercial projects “creat[e] various facades behind which they can hide” in order to 
overcome the holdout problem and assemble multiple parcels of land at reasonable 
acquisition prices.104
Secret buying agents also have been successful in aggregating land in urban and 
metropolitan areas—usually among the most difficult places to assembly property.  In 
Las Vegas, for example, a real estate group “acquired 2,400 acres of land (consisting 
mostly of parcels of five acres or less) in order to build a master-planned community.”105
In Providence, a development group “assembled 21 separate parcels of land . . . to 
construct a 1.4 million-square-foot mall with space for 160 shops.”106  And in West Palm 
Beach, two developers, using twenty different brokers, secretly “purchas[ed] over 300 
separate parcels from 240 different landowners in nine months” to assemble twenty-six 
contiguous downtown blocks.107
Buying agents are able to circumvent the holdout problem using a double-blind 
acquisition system.  First, existing owners do not realize that buying agents are 
attempting to purchase their properties for a larger project.  These owners will thus have 
no incentive or ability to inflate their asking prices and will sell if the offer price exceeds 
their valuation of the property.  Second, the buying agents themselves usually do not 
know that they are attempting to purchase the property for a larger project.  The agents 
themselves thus have no incentive or ability to assist existing owners in holding out for a 
higher price.  Secret buying agents thus fulfill one commentator’s prediction that—as in 
other areas of the law—“there is no a priori reason to believe that the marketplace is 
incapable of crafting private-order solutions to the problem of holdouts.”108
2.  Enabling Socially Desirable Transfers
While both eminent domain and secret buying agents are capable of 
circumventing the holdout problem, eminent domain—unlike secret buying agents—
sometimes causes socially undesirable transfers. Eminent domain may force a transfer 
where the existing owners actually value the land more than the private assembler.  
103
 684 N.W. 2d 765, 783-84 (Mich. 2004).
104 Id.
105 Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism in Support of 
Petitioners, at *5, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
106 Id. at 5-6.
107 Id. at 6.
108
 Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 88 (1998).  In corporate law, for example, private purchasers use 
tender offers to overcome the holdout problem.  See id. (citing J. Gregory Sidack & Susan E. Woodward, 
Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Firm’s Publicly Traded Stock, 25 GA. 
L. REV. 783, 801-05 (1991)) (noting that the tender offer is “an innovation in corporate law designed to 
overcome the holdout problem associated with control transactions); id. at 89 (concluding that “corporate 
law is empirical proof that the holdout problem can be overcome without governmental intervention”); see 
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.9, at 390 (3d ed. 1986) (describing tender 
offers as a type of “private eminent domain”).
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Buying agents, by contrast, eliminate this risk of erroneous condemnations through 
voluntary transactions, which ensure that every transfer is mutually beneficial (and thus 
socially desirable).  
The United States Supreme Court has long-recognized that there is no practicable 
mechanism for determining how much existing owners actually (i.e., subjectively) value 
their property.109 The actual or subjective value of an owner’s property includes the 
personal values that an owner attaches to the land, including sentimental and 
idiosyncratic value.110 These personal values, however, are difficult to quantify.111
Moreover, self-valuations are also impracticable because, in response to the 
government’s offer to purchase or a just compensation determination, existing owners 
have an incentive to inflate their selling prices opportunistically in order to augment their 
own compensation.112 Because personal values are difficult to quantify and because self-
valuations would lead to overstatements, actual value in the context of a threatened 
condemnation is difficult (if not impossible) to calculate.  
As a result, in calculating just compensation for any taking, courts ignore the 
subjective values of existing landowners.113  Instead, courts rely on the “fair market 
value,” an “objective” measure of damages.114 But under the fair market value standard,
109 See United States v. 546.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (noting the “serious practical 
difficulties in assessing the worth [of] particular property at a given time”); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 1 , 6 (1949) (stating that “since a transfer brought about by eminent domain is not a 
voluntary exchange, this amount can be determined only by a guess”); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 
408 (1878) (concluding “that it is perhaps impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all 
cases”).
110 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 569 
(2005) (“[E]ven where the object has close substitutes, the development of habit and familiarity, or 
sentimental connection, may create rational idiosyncratic value.”).
111
 Donald L. Beschle, The Supreme Court’s IOLTA Decision, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 846, 891 (2000) 
(pointing out “the enormous difficulties that would flow from allowing compensation for subjective or 
‘personhood’ losses”); Lawrence V. Berkovich, To Pay or to Convey?: A Theory of Remedies for Breach of 
Real Estate Contracts, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 357 (1995) (asserting that the “idiosyncratic value 
that individuals attach to their land . . . is not quantifiable”); Note, Valuation of Conrail Under the Fifth 
Amendment, 90 HARV. L. REV. 596, 598 (1977) [hereinafter Valuation] (pointing out the “evidentiary 
problems involved in establishing idiosyncratic value”).  
112 See Tung Yin, Reviving Fallen Copyrights, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 383, 406-07 (1997) (“[T]he use of 
subjective value is subject to moral hazard: Property owners have an incentive to present an inflated 
subjective value.”); see also Chicago and North Western Trans. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 665, 669 
(7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he condemnee who asks for more than what the property would have been worth to 
him if the government had not wanted the property is trying to engross ‘hold out’ values—the very thing, 
one might have thought, that the eminent-domain power was intended to excuse the government from 
having to pay.”).
113 See Rachel Croson & Jason Scott Johnston, Experimental Results on Bargaining Under Alternative 
Property Rights Regimes, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50. 53-54 (2000) (“Courts typically do not even attempt to 
discern and compensate for subjective losses above market values.”); Valuation, supra note 111, at 598 
(noting that courts “exclude[] from consideration what may be termed idiosyncratic value to the 
condemnee”); see also Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal With Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 
1994 (2002) (“By assumption, subjective value has no reliably objective measure, which is the 
conventional justification for excluding it from eminent domain compensation.”).
114 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (stating that the Court has 
“employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee’s loss” because of the “need for a 
relatively objective working rule”) (citations omitted); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
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a property’s value is not determined in the market. Rather, the existing owner is “entitled 
to receive ‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the 
taking.”115 This judicially-determined market value, however, neither calculates nor 
compensates a taking’s full costs,116 including demoralization costs.117 Courts thus
systemically underestimate the value of land to existing owners.118
Consequently, whenever the state appropriates land through eminent domain,
instead of through voluntary exchange, a socially undesirable transaction is possible.  
Indeed, a socially undesirable taking may occur whenever the actual value deviates from 
the “market” value.  If the state underestimates the private value of the property to the 
current owner, the state may erroneously appropriate the property from its highest-valued 
user. That is, whenever the private value to the existing owners is greater than the private 
value of the property to the assembler but the government mistakenly believes that the
value to the assembler is greater than the value to the existing owners, the use of eminent 
domain could cause a socially undesirable transfer.119
Using eminent domain for private transfers may also cause socially undesirable 
transactions for another reason.  In addition to underestimating the costs of the taking to 
existing owners, private parties (and the government) sometimes overestimate a project’s
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62 (1987) (“Because [subjective value] is 
difficult to determine, courts have moved to the market value standard.”).
115
 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)).
116 Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005) (“Despite courts’ admonition that just compensation should place an 
owner in the position she would have occupied but for the governmental action, current compensation rules 
exclude whole categories of damages caused by government takings of private property.”); Steven J. Eagle, 
Privatizing Urban Land Use Regulation: The Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 915 (1999) 
(“[G]iven that the destruction of subjective value almost always occurs in eminent domain proceedings, 
‘just compensation’ is hardly ever ‘full compensation.’”); Steven M. Crafton, Comment, Taking the 
Oakland Raiders,: A Theoretical Reconsideration of the Concepts of Public Use and Just Compensation, 
32 EMORY L.J. 857, 890 (1983) (“Because a condemnee, by definition, is an unwilling seller, payment of 
market value will not compensate the person for the loss.”).  
117 See Fischel, supra note 35, at 932 (“Unlike impersonal forces such as markets and the weather, 
governmental actions that take or devalue private property impose on owners and their sympathizers a 
special disutility, which Frank Michelman identified as ‘demoralization cost.’” (citing Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967))); Heller & Krier, supra note 4, at 1001 (“Demoralization has to figure 
into the calculation of final costs and benefits, and thus into the question whether a government program 
enhances or diminishes net welfare.”).
118 See Croson & Johnston, supra note 113, at 68 (noting “the assumption that the court does not attempt 
to discern or compensate for subjective value, and therefore both overcompensates and undercompensates 
systematically”); Crafton, supra note 116, at 891 n.186 (noting that, “[i]n the case of an unwilling seller, 
the market price will undercompensate the seller by the amount of the difference between his subjective 
reservation price and the condemnation price”); see also Coniston Corp. v. Vill. Of Hoffman Estates, 844 
F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Compensation [for takings] in the constitutional sense is therefore not full 
compensation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but 
merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”).
119 See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 126 (“The possibility of undesirable state acquisition of property 
arises when it has eminent domain powers but not when it must acquire property through purchase.  The 
state might underestimate the private value of property and take it when its true private value exceeds its 
value to the public.”)  
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expected benefits.120 Private parties may overestimate expected benefits because such 
determinations are often speculative and difficult to predict.  Private parties also may
intentionally exaggerate the benefits of a taking for the purpose of obtaining the state’s 
condemnation authority.121  And these private parties may do so in situations in which 
they would not have exaggerated the benefits were they attempting to buy the property 
through voluntary exchange.  In Poletown, for example, the City of Detroit and General 
Motors dramatically overestimated the number of jobs that the new plant would create.122
Whether overestimating occurs because expected benefits are difficult to predict or 
because of intentional exaggeration, erroneous valuations of expected benefits also cause
socially undesirable transfers.
In contrast, using secret buying agents eliminates the risk that the state will 
condemn property mistakenly.  Voluntary transactions ensure that only mutually 
beneficial transfers occur.123 Unlike the use of eminent domain, voluntary exchange
using buying agents allows the existing owners’ subjective value to be taken into account.  
At the same time, using buying agents prevents existing owners from strategically 
inflating their valuations.124 Because both parties will bear their expected costs and
expected benefits themselves, their private incentives will be consistent with the optimal 
social incentives. By both overcoming the holdout problem and eliminating the risk of 
120 See Durham, supra note 45, at 1300 (“A government may pursue an inefficient eminent domain action 
because it underestimates the costs or overestimates the benefits of the taking.”).
121 See Ilya Somin, “Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo,” 
Working Paper, George Mason University School of Law (Dec. 2005) (“In the absence of any binding 
obligations to deliver on the promised economic benefits, nothing prevents municipalities and private 
interests from using inflated estimates of economic benefits to justify condemnations and then failing to 
monitor or provide any such benefits once courts approve the takings and the properties are transferred to 
their new owners.”); see also Ken Gewertz, Right of ‘Eminent Domain’ Challenged: Weighing the Benefits 
of Economic Development, HARVARD GAZETTE (Nov. 18, 2004) (“You can always find justification for 
economic development.  I know people at Price Waterhouse who would be delighted to do an economic 
impact study to show that a manufacturing plant or a stadium or a convention center would benefit the 
public.  But then you could do another study that would come up with the opposite results.” (quoting Jerold 
Kayden)).
122 See Brief of Non-Party Institute for Justice and Mackinac Center for Public Policy as Amicus Curiae, 
at 22-23, County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (Nos. 124070-124078) (explaining 
how the City of Detroit and GM claimed the new plant would create 6,150 new jobs but the plant only 
employed 2,500 workers seven years later); see also Gideon Kanner, The New Robber Barons, THE 
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 21, 2002, at A19 (describing the use of eminent domain for a Daimler 
Chrysler Jeep manufacturing plant in Toledo, Ohio, which condemned eighty-three homes but only 
produced 2,100 of the 4,900 jobs developers had promised).
123 See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 126 (“This type of socially undesirable outcome could not occur if the 
state must acquire property by purchasing it, because a private owner will not accept an offer that is less 
than the value he places on the property.”); Merrill, supra note 18, at 64 (“Consensual exchange is almost 
always beneficial to both parties in a transaction, while coerced exchange may or may not be, depending on 
whether the compensation is sufficient to make the coerced party indifferent to the loss.”); cf. Gary S. 
Becker, “On Eminent Domain,” The Becker-Posner Blog, available at http://becker-posner-blog.com/ 
(June 26, 2005) (“[Eminent domain] allows governments to avoid the market test of whether a proposed 
project adds value in the sense that a project is worthwhile even after owners of property are bought out 
through regular market proceedings.”).
124 See Crafton, supra note 116, at 880 (explaining that “private developers who utilize middlemen are 
able to assemble large parcels of land at prices that reflect market competition (opportunity costs) rather 
than the higher prices postulated for the monopoly situation” (citing Munch, supra note 90)). 
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erroneous condemnations, secret buying agents provide a superior—not only 
alternative—mechanism to eminent domain.
3.  Distinguishing Governmental Takings
Secret buying agents also provide a reason for distinguishing between 
constitutional public uses and unconstitutional private uses.  Unlike private parties, the 
government usually cannot use secret buying agents to acquire property for its own 
projects.  These projects are almost always subject to the transparency of democratic 
deliberations and the scrutiny of the local community.  While private parties can choose 
not to disclose their projects, governmental projects are subject to public accountability
and thus publicly known in advance.125 As a result, the government—unlike private 
parties—needs eminent domain to overcome the holdout problem for its own projects.
For example, suppose that a city wishes to construct a new public airport to 
improve transportation.  If the city seeks to build the airport near a major metropolitan 
area, the project will require the assembly of multiple parcels from existing owners.  
However, the state would be unable to acquire these parcels using secret buying agents.  
The consideration, approval, and construction of an airport (like most governmental 
projects) requires public scrutiny and various regulatory approvals.  In selecting a site, for 
instance, the state and city officials would have to consult with the various airlines, the 
affected neighborhoods, and regulatory agencies such as the Federal Aviation 
Administration.  As a result, maintaining the secrecy the new airport would be virtually 
impossible.
In certain limited situations, the government might be able to acquire property 
through buying agents.  For example, if the government seeks to assemble property for a 
military base, the implementation of the project or the location of the land might remain 
classified.  Other factors, however, provide additional countervailing reasons for why 
eminent domain is necessary for the government but unnecessary for private parties.  For 
example, even if the government was able to keep secrets, the combination of secret land 
acquisitions and the need to buy off holdouts raises a significant danger of corruption
between governmental officials and existing owners.126 As one commentator has 
explained:
One can easily imagine government officials charged with engaging in 
secret land assembly tipping off potential sellers about a project, or buying 
off sellers at exorbitant prices in return for kickbacks.  It is one thing for 
private developers to decide when to buy off a holdout and at what price.  
It is quite another, when a government purchasing agent, spending 
taxpayers’ money, makes these decisions without public oversight.  To 
125 See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 125, n.23 (“[G]overnment is often unable to keep its plans quiet 
(indeed, the plans may have come about through a public decisionmaking process), and if so, the secret 
purchase option is not feasible.”); Fischel, supra note 35, at 950 (“Unlike private developers of such 
activities, who can use straw-buyers and other subterfuges, community planning must take place in the 
open, and holdouts will be far more problematic.”); Merrill, supra note 18, at 82 (“[A]lthough buying 
agents, option agreements and straw transactions may work well for private developers, it is unclear 
whether government can use these devices effectively.”).
126 Id.
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avoid this specter of corruption, government may have to use eminent 
domain under circumstances where a private developer, with his own 
money and guile, could use the market.
Overall, therefore, the clear benefits of democratic deliberation (as well as the justified 
skepticism of secret governmental projects) militate strongly in favor of the government’s 
using eminent domain rather than secret purchases.  
Secret buying agents thus provide a reason for distinguishing between 
constitutional public uses (where secret buying agents are ineffective and thus eminent 
domain is necessary) and unconstitutional private uses (where secret buying agents are 
effective and thus eminent domain is unnecessary). While other commentators, as well 
as a few courts, have noted that secret buying agents sometimes allow private parties to 
assemble property,127 this idea has remained relatively undeveloped.  Yet because secret 
buying agents allow private parties—but not the government—to overcome the holdout 
problem and assemble property, secret purchases distinguish those circumstances in 
which eminent domain is necessary and beneficial (and thus provides a “public use”)
from those circumstances in which eminent domain is unnecessary or detrimental (and 
thus provides no “public use”). 
B.  Inordinate Private Influence
1.  The Concentrated Benefit Problem
The use of eminent domain to transfer property from one private owner to another 
should also be disfavored because it increases the potential for inordinate private 
influence.  Private parties that would directly benefit from takings have a strong incentive 
to influence the eminent domain process for their own private advantage. Indeed, 
because private parties can use eminent domain to obtain a relatively concentrated 
benefit, these parties have an incentive to use inordinate influence to achieve their private 
objectives through condemnations.  Thus, not only is the right to take property 
unnecessary for private developers (who can use secret buying agents to circumvent the 
holdout problem), but giving private parties access to eminent domain leads to 
manipulation of the process and socially undesirable takings.
In a taking primarily for a private benefit (e.g., the assembly of land for a real 
estate development), the single beneficiary (e.g., a corporation, casino, or developer) has 
a powerful incentive to capture a concentrated benefit.  By contrast, in a taking primarily 
for the general public (e.g., the acquisition of land for a new highway), the taking 
involves multiple beneficiaries (i.e., all of the future commuters).  Because these multiple 
beneficiaries are more numerous and more dispersed, they have less of an incentive and 
less of an ability to subvert the eminent domain process through inordinate influence.  
The potential for corruption is thus higher in a taking for a private party (which involves 
a single concentrated beneficiary) than a taking for the government (which involves 
multiple, dispersed beneficiaries).128
127 See supra note 18.
128 See Kochan, supra note 108, at 80 (“Because the interest group receives a concentrated benefit, they 
will have an incentive to obtain the legislation by granting special favors to legislators so long as the cost of 
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Moreover, while the private party can use inordinate influence to obtain a 
concentrated benefit, the costs of the taking will be relatively dispersed among affected 
property owners.  As a result, the incentives to oppose the taking will be relatively
attenuated.  While condemnees do not receive full compensation, even partial 
compensation decreases their individual incentives to oppose a taking.129 And an
assembly project that involves multiple owners also creates a coordination problem 
because individual owners will free ride off of the other affected owners.  Overall,
therefore, private parties seeking a concentrated benefit are capable of using eminent 
domain to exploit bargaining and free rider problems among existing owners. 
Furthermore, the political check against the private use of eminent domain is 
relatively ineffective for several reasons.  First, as Justice Marshall noted, the time lag, 
which often entails several years, between the time of the condemnation and the time at 
which the consequences of the condemnation will be known may undermine political 
accountability.130 Second, because the costs of the just compensation associated with the 
taking are dispersed among all taxpayers,131 taxpayers have neither a sufficient incentive 
nor the relevant information to oppose particular condemnations for private parties.132
Third, as a repeat player within the legislature, private parties, unlike dispersed 
landowners, enjoy a substantial advantage in the political process.133 Fourth, private 
the investment does not exceed the benefit they will obtain.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public 
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
223, 229 (1996) (“Pre-existing coalitions and groups of allied individuals will be more effective than 
dispersed individuals in obtaining transfers of wealth from society as a whole to themselves.”); Daniel 
Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279, 289 (1992) (“If public choice 
has any one key finding, it is that small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence 
on the political process.”).
129 See Kochan, supra note 108, at 82 (1998) (“[T]he existence of compensation, even when not truly 
substituting for market or subjective value, decreases the cost to the affect owner of the land seized and 
thereby decreases his incentive to invest in fighting the condemnation.” (citing Farber, supra note 128, at
289-91 (1992))).
130 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 114 n.1 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that “the time lag
between when the deprivations are imposed and when their effects are felt may diminish the efficacy of this 
political safeguard”); see also Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347 (2000) (“Because government actors 
respond to political, not market, incentives, we should not assume that government will internalize social 
costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay.”).
131 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
934, 944 (2003) (noting that the “government’s decision to condemn property has little direct effect on any 
individual taxpayer”).
132 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 916, 
968-71 (2005) (pointing out that just compensation may deter political opposition to takings by transferring  
costs from a “geographically concentrated, intensely interested, politically powerful constituency” to 
“dispersed taxpayers”); Kochan, supra note 108, at 81 (explaining that, because “costs are widely 
dispersed,” “[i]t is not cost-efficient . . . for a taxpayer to fight a particular piece of special-interest 
legislation” in the context of eminent domain); MICHAEL HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A 
THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 69-70 (1981) (noting that “[m]embers of the mass public will generally 
find it irrational to obtain the information necessary to identify their interests on any given issue”).
133 See Kochan, supra note 108, at 82 (1998) (pointing out that “the special interest is likely to have more 
political influence, because unlike the landowner, the interest group is probably a repeat player in the 
political process and thereby able to offer more to legislators”); Farber, supra note 128, at 289-90
(recognizing that “potential victims of takings lack the advantages of being repeat players in the political 
‘game’” and are “disadvantaged by the one-shot nature of their involvement”).
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development agencies—rather than the legislature—often retain the actual eminent 
domain authority, but such agencies are not democratically accountable.134 As a result, 
the political process usually will be unable to compensate for the inordinate influence that 
private parties exert in seeking the condemnation authority for their own advantage.135
In this way, private parties seeking to utilize eminent domain to obtain a 
concentrated benefit may subvert the process for their own advantage.  Because of the 
substantial potential benefit, these parties have a socially perverse incentive to pursue 
profit-maximizing opportunities that may not be in the public interest.  In contrast, 
private entities are less likely to capture the political process when the government uses 
the power of eminent domain for a project that benefits dispersed members of the public.
Therefore, because of this greater potential for inordinate private influence, the use of 
eminent domain should be disfavored for private objectives.
2.  The Costless Acquisition Problem
A second problem with private influence occurs because private parties usually
are not required to pay any compensation to either the condemnees or the state when 
eminent domain is used on their behalf. In Kelo, for example, the private beneficiary of 
the state’s use of eminent domain negotiated a ninety-nine year lease with the 
redevelopment corporation for one dollar per year.136  Likewise, in Cousins Island, 
Maine, the state seized a parking lot near a ferry landing from one private owner and 
leased the lot to the ferry owner for the same use for one dollar per year.137  In Corona, 
California, the city promised to acquire and sell four parcels of land for one dollar to a 
developer, who would also receive one million dollars in tax rebates.138
134 Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation 
Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 52 (2005) (“Under the laws of most jurisdictions, local 
development agencies are created by government but often act very independently of legislative control.
These agencies hold the power to wield eminent domain, typically with only a subsequent rubber-stamp 
approval process from a legislative body.  The isolation of these agencies makes them unusually 
susceptible to coercion and influence, especially by wealthy developers and influential citizens.”).
135 See Garnett, supra note 131, at 977 (noting that “the available evidence strongly suggests that private 
parties standing to benefit from an exercise of eminent domain frequently exert political pressure on the 
condemning government”); Durham, supra note 45, at 1309 n. 187 (noting the “inefficient takings that 
result from the weakness of the political check on the use of eminent domain: the corruption, unfairness, or 
mistakes of elected officials and the electorate’s failure to effectively or fairly review the actions of its 
representatives”).
136 See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2660 n.4 (“While this litigation was pending before the 
Superior Court, . . . the NLDC was negotiating a 99-year ground lease with Corcoran Jennison, a developer 
selected from a group of applicants.  The negotiations contemplated a nominal rent of $1 per year . . . .”
(citing Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509-10, 540 (Conn. 2004))).
137 See Blanchard v. Dep’t of Transportation, 798 A.2d 1119, 1128 (Me. 2002); see also BERLINER, supra
note 8, at 91.
138 See Claire Vitucci, Corona Agrees to Office Project: The Deal Calls for the City to Acquire Four 
Parcels Surrounding the Site on South Main Street, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), at B1 (Apr. 
20, 2000); see also BERLINER, supra note 8, at 26-27.  Under tax-increment-financing schemes, developers 
can avoid paying taxes, as well as paying for the newly-acquired land.  See generally Alyson Tomme, Note, 
Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or Private Abuse?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 216-29 (2005) (outlining the 
history and expansion of tax increment financing).
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Because private developers can benefit from the state’s use of eminent domain 
without bearing any of the costs, developers will use the takings power excessively in 
pursuing their objectives.  When a private party is not required to pay the full costs of a 
good, the party will consume too high a quantity of the good (in this case, land).  Private 
developers thus have the potential for a windfall gain without paying any of the attendant 
costs.  As a result, these entities have a socially perverse incentive to capture the eminent 
domain process for their own advantage.  And these developers may have this incentive 
even while they may not have sought or acquired the land if they were required to pay the 
actual value through consensual transactions (or even the “market” value through just 
compensation). 
The ability of private developers to acquire property costlessly also causes an 
additional problem.  Costless acquisition gives developers an incentive to “back out” of 
transactions after condemnations have already occurred if the circumstances have 
changed.139  Unlike normal purchasers, private developers who benefit from eminent 
domain usually are not required to commit to a project until after the existing properties 
have been condemned and demolished. If a private developer initially overestimates 
expected benefits (or a more attractive opportunity later arises), the private developer can 
decide to forego the project because the state—rather than the developer—has expended 
the resources necessary to acquire the property.  Thus, a developer who is not required to 
make the initial investment (either in buying the property or in using secret agents to buy 
the property) is more likely to abandon an ongoing project before completion.140
Thus, the ability of a private developer to acquire and assemble land without 
incurring any costs leads to both an excessive number of takings and to the possibility 
that a developer will “back out” after a project has already been commenced.  The 
139 See, e.g., Andrew Rice, NYSE’s Chairman Unplugs His Plans for a New Exchange, N.Y. OBSERVER, 
Dec. 3, 2001, at 1, and Charles V. Bagli, 45 Wall St. Is Renting Again Where Tower Deal Failed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at B3 (describing how New York City lost over $109 million when the New York 
Stock Exchange backed out of plans to move to a new site that the City had acquired through eminent 
domain); Amy S. Rosenberg, Stunned Atlantic City Officials Put up a Good Front, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 2000, at C1 (describing Mirage Resort’s abrupt pull-out of a planned casino, thus 
leaving a newly-constructed tunnel to nowhere); Robert Robb, Count on City-Driven Project to Fail, THE 
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 21, 2001 (describing Mesa’s condemnation and purchase of 63 homes at a cost 
of $6 million so that a developer could construct an entertainment village, the financing of which 
eventually fell through leaving a vacant lot).
140
 For example, suppose an assembly project is initially worth $2.5 million to a developer, and the state 
can acquire the land (for the developer) through eminent domain for $2 million.  Suppose, however, that 
after the state expends $1 million buying properties, the value of the project to the developer decreases 
from $2.5 million to $1.5 million.  Because the private developer knows there are no consequences from 
withdrawing, the developer withdraws from the project because $1.5 million < $2 million.  The state thus 
spends $1 million transforming viable homes and business into vacant lots.
     In contrast, the secret-agent mechanism forces the developer (like other normal buyers) to commit to a 
project ex ante rather than shifting a project’s risk to the state.  Suppose again that an assembly project is 
initially worth $2.5 million to a developer, and now the developer can acquire the land through secret 
agents for $2 million.  Suppose that after the developer’s buying agents expend $1 million secretly 
purchasing properties, the value of the project to the developer decreases from $2.5 million to $1.5 million.  
Because the developer knows that it must pay a total of $2 million for the secret agents to buy all the 
necessary land, the developer will continue with the project (even though $1.5 million < $2 million) 
because $1 million has already been sunk and $1.5 million (the benefits of continuing the project) > $1 
million (the costs of continuing with the project).  Requiring the developer to use buying agents rather than 
eminent domain forces the private beneficiary—rather than society—to bear the risk of the project.
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costless acquisition of property for a developer through the state’s use of eminent domain 
thus leads to an additional form of corruption.  Because private developers can use 
eminent domain to achieve a concentrated benefit and because they can do so without 
incurring any costs, they will have a strong incentive to use almost any means (including 
intensive lobbying, political contributions, expensive lawyers, threats to relocate, and 
sometimes even bribery) to obtain the takings power for their own private objectives.
3.  The Resource Disparity Problem
The third form of inordinate influence involves the private manipulation of the 
eminent domain process by exploiting disparities in legal and financial resources. Private 
parties often prefer to overcome the holdout problem through eminent domain rather than 
through private bargaining using buying agents.141  Local government is especially 
susceptible to the resources of affluent private developers who promise more jobs and tax 
revenue.142 As a result, private entities often use their superior legal sophistication and 
financial resources to co-opt the eminent domain process—an authority intended for the 
public interest—for their own private advantage.  Thus, allowing private parties to use 
the state’s power of eminent domain systematically advantages large market players 
(including real estate and condominium developers, corporations, and large 
entertainments facilities such as casinos and sports stadiums) over existing owners with 
fewer financial and legal resources (including low-income and working class 
homeowners, the elderly, local stores and small businesses, houses of worship, and racial 
and ethnic minorities).143
The history of eminent domain also shows a pattern of invidious discrimination 
against racial and ethnic minorities.144  According to one commentator, “the displacement 
of African-Americans and urban renewal projects were so intertwined that ‘urban 
141 See Kochan, supra note 108, at 52-53 (“Rather than discovering innovative bargaining measures to 
overcome the high transaction costs associated with some land acquisition in the marketplace, including the 
costs associated with holdout behavior, interest groups would rather access the cheaper alternative of 
eminent domain that allows the coercive acquisition of land.”).
142 See Boudreaux, supra note 134, at 4 (“[M]any local governments, especially the cash-poor central 
cities, are trying ever harder to raise revenue by attracting businesses and wealthy residents—and 
discouraging the poor—thus making an eminent domain an irresistible tool.”); Adam Helleger, Eminent 
Domain as an Economic Development Tool, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 901, 903 (2001) (“[L]ocal 
government is extremely susceptible to corporate influence when making its economic development 
decisions” because of the “greater involvement of business in setting local public policy, the increasing 
competition for jobs between localities, and a concomitant rise in the amount of state and local government 
subsidy of corporate activity.”).
143 See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fallout from this 
decision will not be random.  The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate 
influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms.  As for 
the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those 
with more.”); id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[E]xtending the concept of public purpose to 
encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on 
poor communities.  Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the 
highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”).
144 See, e.g., Garrett v. Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971); see also 12 THOMPSON ON REAL 
PROPERTY 194, 98.02(e) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (quoting James Baldwin) (“The history of eminent 
domain is rife with abuse specifically targeting minority neighborhoods.”); 
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renewal’ was often referred to as ‘Negro removal.’”145  Moreover, eminent domain 
imposes a disproportionate impact on racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the 
economically disadvantaged and elderly.146  Indeed, in their brief supporting the 
petitioners in Kelo, several civil rights organizations pointed out that “the economically 
disadvantaged and, in particular, racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly . . . have 
been targeted for the use and abuse of the eminent domain power in the past and there is 
evidence that . . . these groups will be both disproportionately and specially harmed by 
the exercise of that expanded power.”147
Disparities in legal and financial resources also may cause quid pro quo
corruption, which occurs between local officials and private developers.148 In such an 
arrangement, the benefit to the private developer is the ability to obtain and assemble 
land without purchasing the property for the full price.149  On the other hand, the 
motivations of the local authorities for engaging in quid pro quo corruption may be either 
benevolent or malevolent: benevolent if the authorities subjectively believe the taking 
will improve the local community; malevolent if the authorities are pursuing their own 
self-interest (e.g., with side payments, bribes, kickbacks, or campaign contributions) 
rather than the public interest.150
Disparities in legal and financial resources thus create the opportunity for the 
private exploitation of the economically disadvantaged and politically disfavored.  These 
disparities in resources, coupled with the perverse incentives of private developers 
seeking a concentrated benefit with minimal acquisition costs, indicate that the use of the 
takings power for private parties often leads to misuse of the process.  Thus, for two 
reasons—the superiority of secret buying agents and the increased potential for 
corruption—the eminent domain power should generally not be used on behalf of private 
parties.  In contrast, the state’s inability to use secret buying agents and the diminished 
possibility of inordinate private influence indicate that eminent domain is both necessary 
and appropriate for the government.  The new theory based on secret purchases and 
private influence thus provides a principle for interpreting the public use requirement and 
distinguishing between public and private uses.
145 Id.
146 See B. FRIEDEN & L. SAGALAYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 28 (1989) (“Of 
all the families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was 
known were nonwhite, and of those families 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of whites had incomes 
low enough to qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom available to them.”); Kelo, 545 U.S. 
__, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2687 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “[o]ver 97 percent of the individuals forcibly 
removed from their homes by the ‘slum-clearance’ project upheld by this Court in Berman were black”) 
(citing Berman, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954)).
147 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, AARP, et al. 
in Support of Petitioners, at 7, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-
108).
148 See, e.g., Durham, supra note 45, at 1297-1300 (explaining that the selection of the route for the 
Cross-Bronx Expressway may have had more to do with political corruption, familial favoritism, and 
private influence than promoting the general welfare because the route selected affected over eighty times
the number of families as the alternative (citing ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER 877 (1974)).
149 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
150 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 92 (1957) (“Favor-buying is usually 
nothing so crude as bribery; it is the subtler device of making campaign contributions in return for a 
favorable disposition of attitudes by a party . . . .”).
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C.  Counterarguments
1.  Positive Externalities
As discussed above, secret buying agents facilitate consensual purchases of land if 
a transfer is socially desirable—i.e., if the value of the properties to the private assembler
is greater than the value of the properties to the existing owners.151  Conversely, if the 
value of the project to the assembler is less than the value of the properties to the existing 
owners, no transaction will occur. However, a situation could arise in which the private
benefit of the taking is lower than the actual value of the properties to all of the existing 
owners, but the social benefit of the taking is greater than the actual value to the existing 
owners.  That is, in certain situations a private benefit may not be large enough to induce 
a private party to assemble property even though a positive externality makes the project 
socially desirable. 
Suppose, for example, that a private party wanted to assemble ten parcels of land 
that had a total value to the party of $15 million when assembled.  Suppose also that the
value to the ten existing owners of the ten parcels was $1 million per parcel or $10 
million overall.  With secret buying agents, the private party would purchase the property 
because the value to the assembler ($15 million) is greater than the value to the existing 
owners ($10 million).  However, suppose that the assembly contains a positive externality 
such that the private value that the assembler could internalize is only $9 million while 
the overall social value is $15 million.  In this situation, the private benefit would not be 
large enough to induce the assembler to purchase the property—even using secret 
agents—because the benefit to the assembler ($9 million) is less than the value to the 
existing owners ($10 million).  That is, the existence of a substantial positive externality 
prevents a socially desirable assembly from occurring even with secret buying agents.
Historically, the Mill Acts, which allowed private parties to condemn and flood 
riparian lands to provide for grist-mills,152 illustrate the advantage of using eminent 
domain where a substantial externality exists. The justification for the condemnation 
authority of the Mill Acts—like the justification for eminent domain generally—was to 
provide a mechanism for overcoming the holdout problem.153 But the Mill Acts provided
all members of society with a vital public benefit—indeed, a “necessity”154—that 
151 See supra note Part III.A.2.
152 See NICHOLS § 7.07[4][f][i] (“The Mills Acts . . . gave mill owners liberty to continue and improve 
mill ponds, paying damages for raising the water.  The acts were revised in 1795 and the mill owner was 
allowed to flood any lands necessary to erect a mill.”).
153 See John F. Hart, Property Rights, Costs, and Welfare: Delaware Water Mill Legislation 1719-1859, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 455, 455 (1998) (describing opportunistic holdouts that often prevented private 
bargaining around mill sites); see also John F. Hart, The Maryland Mill Act, 1669-1766: Economic Policy 
and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private Property, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 5-6; Carol M. Rose, 
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 271 
(1990); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 17-21 (1982).
154 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 586 (Zarella J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“From the first settlement 
of the country grist-mills of this description have been in some sense peculiar institutions, invested with a 
general interest. . . . In many instances they have been not merely a convenience, but almost a necessity in 
the community.” (quoting Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866))); Hart, supra note 153, at 455 
(pointing out that “[g]ristmills and other water-powered mills played a central part in American economic 
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otherwise could not have been obtained. As a result, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld condemnations under the Mill Acts as legitimate public uses.155 Thus, certain 
activities, like the maintenance of functioning grist-mills in colonial America, may
produce a positive externality so significant that eminent domain may be necessary to 
supplement private incentives and ensure that these transactions occur.156
However, the exception for positive externalities should be limited for several 
reasons.  First, if the private benefits of a project are insufficient to induce private parties 
to assemble the land, a public subsidy may be possible to provide a sufficient incentive to 
assemble the property.  The government may subsidize any project (including the 
assembly of land through secret agents) if the government determines that the project 
involves a distinct positive externality.  While a public subsidy is a common solution to 
this type of externality,157 such a subsidy may not be feasible ext ante while maintaining 
the anonymity of secret buying agents. However, such a subsidy could be given ex post 
without affecting the ability of secret agents to overcome the holdout problem. In this 
way, secret purchases remain possible even with the subsidies that may be necessary to 
supplement private incentives if an externality exists.
Second, even without the possibility of an ex post subsidy, eminent domain 
should not be used on behalf of private parties without a positive externality of a 
magnitude that is likely to create a significant difference in the private and social 
incentives for assembling the property.  If there is not a substantial externality associated 
with the private transaction, then private bargaining (using secret buying agents) would
produce the optimal result.  While negotiations between secret buying agents and existing 
owners may fail, these types of bargaining problems exist with any market transaction.158
Courts, as well as legislatures, generally do not have enough information to interfere with 
such bargaining.  As a result, they should not permit the private use of eminent domain 
unless the transaction involves a significant positive externality. 
Third, the exception for externalities should also be limited because the definition 
of “externality” is relatively amorphous.159  Virtually any development might be said to 
development”); Requiem, supra note 4, at 604-05 (noting that, at least during the colonial period, mills 
were “essential to community existence”).
155 See, e.g., Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co, 113 U.S. 9, 26 (1885) (upholding New Hampshire Mill Acts 
because “maintaining the validity of general mill acts as taking private property for public use, in the strict 
constitutional meaning of that phrase, . . . is clearly valid as a just and reasonable exercise of the power of 
the legislature”). 
156
 Hart, supra note 153, at 461-69 (discussing “externalities among mills” and concluding that the Mill 
Acts “substantially expanded the incentives of entrepreneurs to invest in and maximize the value of mill 
property, increasing societal welfare as well as the welfare of owners of existing mills”).
157 See supra note 26.
158 See SHAVELL, supra note 17, at 124 (“The possibility of such breakdowns in bargaining is not special 
to transactions involving the state, however—it is an aspect of virtually all trade—so this alone does not 
furnish a justification for the state to enjoy the power to take.”)
159 Compare PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 751 (15th ed. 1995) (defining 
externalities as “activities that affect others for better or worse, without those others paying or being 
compensated for the activity”) with R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 24 (1988) 
(defining an externality as “the effect of one person’s decision on someone who is not a party to that 
decision”); cf. Crafton, supra note 116, at 865 n.45 (“Since all economic activity generates externalities of 
one sort or another, a public use definition that is based solely on the concept of externalities would provide 
no limitation on eminent domain.”).
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be able to benefit the community.160 However, a private party’s providing additional jobs 
or tax revenue does not constitute a positive externality, unless the jobs have some 
incidental effect on social welfare.161  A positive externality can only justify the private 
use of eminent domain if it is a benefit that the assembler could not have internalized.
Thus, the existence of a positive externality may necessitate the use of eminent domain 
(rather than secret buying agents) in certain limited situations but only if a clear 
externality of a substantial magnitude exists and cannot otherwise be solved through a 
subsidy.
2.  Timing Problems and Collusion
Two additional objections involve the possibility of timing problems and the 
potential for collusion.  First, one of eminent domain’s advantages as a mechanism for 
acquiring and aggregating land is that property may be obtained almost immediately.  
That is, the use of eminent domain avoids the time and resources involved in bargaining.  
By contrast, under the new theory, private developers must use buying agents to bargain
individually with each existing owner.  However, such individualized bargaining may not 
work if the buyer needs to assemble land quickly in order to exploit its highest and best 
use.  Indeed, some states actually have “quick take” procedures in which the government 
(on behalf of a private developer) can acquire and demolish a person’s home or business
before the opportunity for a hearing.  If the value of the project depends on the quick 
acquisition of property, secret agents may be inadequate because they often require 
several years to aggregate property in order to preserve anonymity.  
However, the use of eminent domain is not always a faster mechanism than 
buying agents for assembling land, and even when it may be quicker, it is not necessarily 
socially desirable.  The aggregate number of years spent executing redevelopment 
projects (and often litigating the validity of condemnations) is usually greater than the 
number of years necessary for buying agents to aggregate property through voluntary 
transactions.162 Moreover, while eminent domain provides a preemptive mechanism for 
immediate assemblage, it does so at the cost of foregoing more information about a 
160 See Fischel, supra note 35, at  934 (“Only in the broadest sense of public goods, which allows that 
such activities have ‘spillover effects’ that are difficult for providers to profit from, can most traditional 
uses of eminent domain be justified.”).  
161 See Crafton, supra note 116:
These externalities, however, are really no different than the benefits that a community gets from 
any productive business.  One of the key characteristics of the free market is consumer surplus—
that is, at least some of the benefits generated by enterprises accrue not to the enterprise but to 
those who interact with it.  Professor (now Judge) Posner has put it succinctly: “Productive people 
put more into society than they take out of it.”  But surely this fact alone could not stand as the 
justification for declaring all productive individuals and businesses public and thereby allowing 
them to be “taken” for public use.  A theory of “public” that myopically concentrates on 
externalities, however, could lead to such an absurd conclusion.
Id. at 894-95 (quoting Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103, 128-29 (1979)).
162 See Garnett, supra note 131, at 954 (noting that urban renewal projects “tended to proceed at an 
excruciatingly slow pace” and that “[o]n average, it took three years for the local government even to sell 
the condemned land to a private developer”).
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project’s social desirability.163  Thus, even if secret buying agents sometimes take longer 
than the use of eminent domain, this trade-off might still be socially desirable if the 
benefits from preventing the socially undesirable transfers that eminent domain 
sometimes allows outweigh the costs associated with delaying the acquisition.
Three other potential “timing” problems may exist with buying agents.  First, 
certain owners (e.g., owners who previously did not have their properties for sale), may 
not choose to sell at any price that secret agents offer.  These owners may become 
suspicious that an assembly is occurring if a buyer approaches unexpectedly, especially if 
buying agents continue to become an increasingly common practice.  Second, acquiring 
land through secret agents also requires private developers to bear high initial costs.  A 
private party is required to have a significant amount of investment capital before the 
commencement of an assembly project.  Third, a private developer might receive a lower 
return on this land while the other parcels are being purchased because the developer 
cannot commence the project until secret agents have purchased all of the parcels.  
However, most existing owners do sell to secret buying agents at some price when the 
offer price exceeds their actual value; most private parties (such as corporations, real-
estate developers, and casinos) usually have sufficient funding for initial costs, and most 
private developers can receive a property’s rental value by leasing the land for its existing 
use until all parcels have been assembled.  Thus, these objections, while theoretically 
plausible, may be relatively insignificant in practice.
Finally, because private developers must employ third parties as buying agents, 
this mechanism raises the possibility of collusion between buying agents and existing 
owners.  For example, secret agents might tip off sellers or agree to a higher price in 
exchange for a kickback.  However, this collusion problem exists in every other agency 
relationship in which a principal monitors its agents (albeit while incurring some agency 
costs).   Moreover, in practice, secret agents themselves often do not even know that they 
are buying property for an assembly project.164  As noted above, developers using secret 
purchases not only hide the identity of buying agents from existing owners and the public 
but also hide the identity of buying agents from each other.  Because of this double-blind 
acquisition system in which each buying agent acts independently and anonymously, the 
likelihood of corruption is relatively attenuated.
3.  Distrust and Resentment
Finally, secret purchases may increase societal distrust and resentment.  Because 
transactions normally occur between two parties negotiating with full disclosure and 
without buying agents, the use of such agents generally is viewed as deceptive.  Existing 
owners who discover that they have sold to developers through secret buying agents may 
resent such buyers and distrust future buyers (even those not employing secret agents).  
The possibility of creating such a trading environment, as well as its implications for a 
163 Cf. Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum, 93 GEO. L.J. 993, 1004 (2005) 
(noting that “delay in the use of force has value as a real option” because “information becomes better over 
time”).
164 See, e.g., O’Reiley, supra note 100, at 2 (“[G]reat care was taken [by Disney] to make sure that none 
of the buyers knew about each other, even if they worked in the same firm.”).
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market economy, must therefore be explored and compared to the current institutional 
arrangement.
Upon discovering that secret buying agents have assembled land discreetly, 
individual sellers, as well as the affected communit y, may resent the buyer’s use of such
agents.  The citizens of Allston and the mayor of Boston, for example, were outraged that 
Harvard University secretly purchased fourteen parcels of land for $88 million.165 The 
Boston mayor was “so incensed that he adopted a mocking sing-song tone to mimic his 
view of Harvard’s attitude, saying: ‘We’re from Harvard, and we’re going to do what we 
want.”166  Likewise, members of the community were outraged at the University for its 
secret land acquisitions.167  In response, Harvard officials spent a significant amount of 
time and money, including voluntary payments to the government in lieu of property 
taxes,168 reviving Harvard’s relationships and public image within the community.169
Perhaps more importantly, secret buying agents may create distrust between 
normal buyers and sellers because sellers may be suspicious that a buyer is actually a 
secret agent. Normally, buyers and sellers negotiate believing (and therefore, relying on 
the fact) that the other party is acting in good faith and with full disclosure.  However, if
some percentage of buyers are buying agents, sellers might become more suspicious and 
less willing to sell without verification of a buyer’s identity or disclosure of a buyer’s 
objective. As a result, the use of buying agents may create incidental monitoring costs.  
Sellers, for example, might take socially wasteful precautions, such as spending time and 
money investigating whether buyers are independent buyers or actually secret agents.
However, while secret buying agents may create some level of distrust and 
resentment, the use of eminent domain (especially for private parties) causes similar
problems.170  Indeed, the level of resentment caused by a taking due to eminent domain 
165 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
166 Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Reveals Secret Purchases of 52 Acres Worth $88 Million in 
Allston, BOSTON GLOBE, June 10, 1997, at A1; see also id. (“The mayor also warned that unless Harvard 
gives the city a better indication as to how the university wants to use the land, the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority could make it difficult for the school to proceed with any current redevelopment plans it has for 
its other property.”).
167 See Tina Cassidy & Don Aucoin, Harvard Says Its Purchases Violated Trust; Menino Demands 
Scholarships in Return for Allston Land Buys, BOSTON GLOBE, June 11, 1997, at B1 (“Clearly, Harvard has 
a lot of ground to make up with some community residents who were incensed to learn that the university 
concealed its role in major land purchases for nearly a decade.”).
168 See id. (“As a nonprofit, Harvard has no legal obligation to pay taxes on much of its land.  The school 
agreed in 1999 to boost its payments in lieu of taxes to Boston, offering $40 million over 20 years, which is 
$12 million more than under its previous agreement.  (Other schools have similar arrangements.)”).
169 See Kate Zernike & Marcella Bombardieri, Town Tensions Thawing as Harvard Earns Allston’s 
Trust; University Wins Plaudits with Housing Support, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2003, at B3 (describing the 
“example[s] of the work Harvard has done over the last few years—partly by opening its checkbook, but 
also with other forms of help—to overcome the mistrust engendered by the secret land buys”); Kate 
Zernike, Harvard Starts Mending Fences; Looking to Grow, School Cultivates Its ‘Host Cities,’ BOSTON 
GLOBE, October 12, 1999, at B1 (“By their own account, Harvard’s top administrators have embarked on 
an aggressive campaign to prove that the university is a good neighbor to what it now deferentially refers to 
as its ‘host cites.’”).
170 See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1961) (“Whole communities 
are torn apart and sown to the winds, with a reaping of cynicism, resentment and despair that must be heard 
and seen to be believed . . . .”).
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may even be greater because of the government’s imprimatur171 and because 
compensation usually will be undercompensatory.172 Moreover, the use of buying agents 
may become less shocking as the number of developers using buying agents continues to 
increase.  Finally, while excessive monitoring may occur in certain circumstances, 
administrative costs are generally higher for using eminent domain than secret agents.173
Thus, while the distrust and resentment associated with secret purchases are potential 
concerns, these considerations—like the possibility of positive externalities, timing 
problems, and collusion—either apply only in certain limited circumstances or do not 
impose greater costs than the comparative institutional arrangement under eminent 
domain.  Overall, therefore, the availability of secret buying agents and the potential for 
inordinate private influence generally makes eminent domain unnecessary for private 
parties. 
IV.  APPLICATIONS OF THE NEW THEORY
A. Kelo and Economic Development
Promoting economic development can be defined broadly as any situation in 
which the state transfers non-blighted property from one private owner to another in 
order to increase the effective utilization of property.  Because the use of eminent domain 
for economic development often destroys existing homes or businesses, the asserted 
public interest is usually based on the potential for incidental public benefits such as
increasing jobs or augmenting tax revenue.  In Kelo, for example, city officials argued 
that condemning over ninety homes and businesses to construct new office buildings and 
a hotel was essential for increasing the city’s tax base and paying for schools and 
services.174 However, applying the foregoing economic analysis to Kelo, secret 
purchases (rather than eminent domain) should most likely have been used in attempting 
to acquire these properties.
171 See Boudreaux, supra note 134, at 49 (“Being evicted from one’s home, by no fault of one’s own, is 
likely to alienate one further from one’s government and community.  This is especially true when the 
locality is admittedly trying to replace certain housing stock—and perhaps even categories of people—with 
others.”); cf. Boudreaux, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 579 
(2001) (“While people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity, when the windfall arrives as 
a result of a strategic and deliberate decision of the government, the reaction may turn to resentment and 
frustration.”).
172 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
173 See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 287, 291, 296-97 (2005)
(“Eminent domain is much more costly than market exchange; it incurs the transaction costs that 
accompany all legislative action; it involves procedural hurdles such as filing a judicial complaint, serving 
process, and undertaking a professional appraisal of the property in question; it involves a hearing on both 
‘the condemnation’s legality and the amount of compensation due’; and it may involve protracted 
litigation.” (quoting Merrill, supra note 18, at 77)); Fischel, supra note 35, at  934 (“[C]ompared to 
incremental, consensual transactions, eminent domain is quite costly for the government.  Hiring attorneys 
and appraisers, hearing appeals, and conducting trials adds to the cost of a given transaction.  When 
ordinary market transactions are available, they are normally cheaper for the government to use than 
eminent domain.”); see also Garnett, supra note 131, at 969 (noting the “high ‘due process costs’ that 
attend an exercise of eminent domain” (quoting Merrill, supra note 18, at 77-80)). 
174 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Kelo represents the classic holdout situation because only seven property owners 
refused to sell at the redevelopment corporation’s price.  Secret agents could have 
overcome this holdout problem through consensual transactions. The dozens of existing 
owners who sold under the threat of eminent domain almost certainly would have sold to 
buying agents as well, although these owners would have been more likely to receive full
compensation.175 Similarly, the seven existing owners who held out even under the threat 
of eminent domain most likely would have sold to secret buying agents at some price
above their actual valuation of their homes. If these existing owners refused to sell (even 
without being aware of the assembly project), then these owners presumably valued the 
property more highly than the developer.  The anonymity of secret agents would have 
eliminated any possibility of the existing owners’ opportunistically inflating their selling
prices. Thus, secret buying agents, like eminent domain, could have prevented any 
strategic holdout among existing owners.
However, unlike eminent domain, secret buying agents would have eliminated the 
possibility of an erroneous taking.  By ignoring the actual value of the property to the
homeowners, the redevelopment corporation’s use of eminent domain may have 
compelled a property transfer that was socially undesirable if the owners’ subjective
values deviated from the market value.  In this case, the evidence that the existing owners 
attach a great deal of sentimental value to their properties,176 coupled with the relatively 
speculative nature of the project’s future benefits,177 suggests that the wisdom of using 
eminent domain to assemble the property was questionable.  The use of secret purchases, 
by contrast, would have forced the developer to take into account the actual costs of the 
project and make an accurate estimation of the expected benefits.
Furthermore, the possibility in Kelo of an erroneous taking was also relatively 
high because of the existence of substantial private influence. New London delegated its
power of eminent domain to a private economic development organization.178 In turn, 
the economic development corporation negotiated with a developer for a ninety-nine year 
lease for the rent of one dollar per year.179  The influence of the Pfizer Corporation
(featured on the development corporation’s own web site) also affected the New London 
175
 Eminent domain—unlike secret buying agents—sometimes compels transactions of otherwise 
unwilling sellers who only choose to sell because they are in the shadow of a potential condemnation.  See
BERLINER, supra note 8, at 6 (“A deal struck voluntarily is quite different than a deal struck with someone 
who says, ‘hand it over, or we’ll take it by force.”); see also Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill, & 
Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the Shadow Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation 
Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083 (1987).
176 See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2660 (“Petitioner Susette Kelo . . . has made extensive 
improvements to her house, which she prizes for its water view.  Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery was born in 
her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there her entire life.  Her husband Charles (also a petitioner) 
has lived in the house since they were married some 60 years ago.”); see also Warren Richey, A Fight To 
Keep Their Homes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, at 1 (Feb. 16, 2005) (“I am a 93-year-old homeowners of 
Fort Trumbull [and] have lived here all my life.  This is our home.  My wife and I do not want to leave 
here.” (quoting Walter Pasqualini) (alterations in original)).
177 See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *76 (Conn. Super. Mar. 13, 2002) 
(finding that development corporation’s hope of attracting Coast Guard Museum was “too speculative to 
justify these condemnations”).
178 See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2659-60 (noting that the city council authorized the “New 
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity” to “purchase property or to acquire 
property by exercising eminent domain in the City’s name”).
179 See supra note 136.
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project.180  Indeed, the stated purpose of the redevelopment project was to complement 
Pfizer’s new facility.181 Finally, the development corporation also exempted an Italian 
Dramatic Club, a politically well-connected organization, while condemning every 
adjacent home.182
The favorable lease terms and the political exemptions likely resulted because the 
beneficiaries of the project, the real-estate developer and Pfizer, were both well-
organized, well-financed private entities that saw a substantial profit-making opportunity.
Thus, unlike a highway through New London that would have had multiple, dispersed 
beneficiaries, the New London project provided a concentrated benefit for both the
developer and Pfizer.  These private actors thus had an extremely high incentive to 
capture and utilize eminent domain for their own advantage.  In contrast, the condemnees
(homeowners with few financial resources and little legal sophistication) were relatively
dispersed. The ninety existing homes and small businesses thus faced a much more 
difficult coordination problem than the development corporation, which was led by a 
former Admiral of the United States Navy and whose Board included attorneys, 
accountants, the former Mayor of the City, and a Yale law professor.  Not surprisingly,
more than ninety percent of property owners sold their property instead of expending 
their own limited legal and financial resources to challenge the condemnations.183
The only remaining determination is whether private parties lacked a sufficient 
incentive to purchase the New London properties because of a substantial positive 
externality that could have prevented an otherwise socially desirable transaction.  Here, 
the project’s proponents argued that the development plan was “projected to create in 
excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically 
distressed city.”184 However, more jobs and higher tax revenue in themselves do not 
constitute positive externalities. Private developers could have contributed these same 
benefits if they acquired the land through secret purchases rather than by eminent 
domain.  But even if other externalities existed and even assuming that a public subsidy 
would not have been possible, it is unclear that any such externality would have been of a 
magnitude that was likely to create a significant difference in the private and social 
incentives for assembling the property.
Moreover, other potential counterarguments are also unpersuasive in this case.  
Timing does not seem to be a problem because the economic development corporation 
180 See Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2659 (“The NLDC intended the development plan to capitalize 
on the arrival of the Pfizer facility and the new commerce it was expected to attract.”); see also id. at 2678 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (characterizing the plan as “suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation”).
181 See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 509 (Conn. 2004) (“In its preface to the development 
plan, the development corporation stated that its goals were to create a development that would 
complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, increase tax and other revenues . . . 
.”); see also id. at 537 (“With respect to Pfizer, the plaintiffs point out that it is, in the words of James 
Hicks, the executive vice president of RKG Associates, the firm that assisted the development corporation 
in the preparation of the development plan, the ‘10,000 pound gorilla’ and ‘a big driving point’ behind the 
development project.”).
182 See id. at 2671-72  (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the redevelopment plan “will also retain the 
existing Italian Dramatic Club (a private cultural organization) though the homes of three plaintiffs in that 
parcel are to be demolished”).
183 See id. at 2660 (“The NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of most of the real estate in the 90-
acre area, but its negotiations with petitioners failed.”).
184 Id. at 2658 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
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has been trying to redevelop this area for several years.185  The litigation surrounding the 
case took over four years—more than enough time for buying agents to acquire the land 
through consensual transactions.186 The danger of collusion is also relatively low; other 
firms have used secret agents successfully in aggregating land in similar situations and a 
developer could have prevented its own buying agents from learning of the larger 
assembly project.187 Finally, while resentment may have occurred if secret agents had 
been used, it is clear that substantial resentment already exists among those owners who 
challenged the city’s condemnations to the U.S. Supreme Court and are now being forced 
from their homes.188 Thus, secret purchases may have been superior to eminent domain 
for assembling property and promoting economic development within the city of New 
London.189
B.  Berman and Blight
While the use of eminent domain for economic development allows the taking of 
property for private benefit even with an existing productive use, the use of eminent 
domain for eliminating blight involves property that is affirmatively deleterious to the 
surrounding community.  Traditional characteristics of blight include abandoned and 
physically-deteriorating buildings, as well as health concerns over the spread of 
disease.190 Modern definitions of blight, by contrast, include such characteristics as “too-
185 See id. at 2659 (noting that Connecticut authorized a $5.35 million bond issue to support the 
development corporation’s planning activities in 1998); id. (noting that New London approved the 
development plan in 2000).
186 See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 511 (2004) (noting that development corporation 
filed condemnation proceedings in November 2000 and plaintiffs challenged the condemnations in 
December 2000).
187 See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
188
 See Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court Ruling, 
N.Y. TIMES, at A20 (June 24, 2005) (quoting plaintiff Susette Kelo) (“I am sick.  Do they have any idea 
what they’ve done?”); id. (quoting plaintiff Bill Von Winkle) (“It’s desperately hard to believe that in this 
country you can lose your home to private developers.  It’s basically corporate theft.”).
189
 In addition to assembly projects as in Kelo, municipalities and private developers also use eminent 
domain for the purpose of redeveloping a single parcel of land.  For example, a city or town may want to 
replace an existing business (such as a mom-and-pop store) with a new business (such as a national chain) 
that could potentially bring in more tax revenue or create more jobs.  Applying the foregoing economic 
analysis, private parties actually confront fewer bargaining problems for acquiring single properties than 
assembling multiple properties because the holdout problem disappears.  The counterarguments against 
secret buying agents are also less convincing for a single property.  In particular, timing is not an issue 
because there is no need to space secret purchases and a buying agent is used only once.  Consequently, the 
possibility of detection is much lower, collusion is easier to monitor, and resentment and excessive 
precautions are less likely.  Thus, this use of eminent domain for economic development appears even less 
justified in this single-property situation than in the assembly situation.  
190 See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development 
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV 1005, 1034 (2005) (“Early blight cases in 
the 1940s and 1950s upheld condemnations in areas that closely fit the layperson’s intuitive notion of 
‘blight’: dilapidated, dangerous, disease-ridden neighborhoods.”); Note, Public Use as a Limitation on 
Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424 (1955) (“[I]ncidental use of eminent 
domain to acquire private property will also be necessary to eliminate blight by removing nonconforming 
buildings, dilapidated houses which discourage neighbors from maintaining adjoining property, and 
perhaps even sound buildings which are crowded too closely together.”).
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small side yards, ‘diverse ownership’ (different people own properties next to each 
other), ‘inadequate planning,’ and lack of a two-car attached garage.”191  Furthermore,
blight designations often include both blighted and non-blighted properties.192  Most 
courts generally view eliminating blight as an adequate justification for eminent domain, 
even when the government eventually transfers the condemned property to another 
private party for a private objective.193 However, courts and commentators often fail to 
address the important initial question of what constitutes blight.
A determination of blight, properly understood, should be based on the existence 
of a negative externality stemming from the property itself.194 A blighted area may 
impose negative externalities on neighboring homes and businesses.195 Abandoned 
buildings, for example, might cause negative externalities by deterring new owners from 
investing in the community, increasing the likelihood of criminal activity, or facilitating
the transmission of infectious diseases.196  Blight thus may be understood as a nuisance—
a condition imposing a negative externality on one’s neighbors—without the 
corresponding benefit characteristic of some nuisances (e.g., practicing a musical 
instrument in an apartment or barbecuing a meal in a backyard).197
Traditional economic analysis suggests several possibilities for dealing with 
negative externalities through legal rules including liability, corrective taxes, and 
subsidies.198 Yet all of these possible solutions are inadequate for eliminating blight.  
191 BERLINER, supra note 8, at 5; see, e.g., Penn. Stat. § 1702 (2002) (defining blight as “inadequate 
planning,” “excessive land coverage by buildings,” “lack of adequate air and light,” “defective design and 
arrangement of buildings,” or “economically or socially undesirable land uses”).
192 See NICHOLS § 7.06[7][c][iv] (“In general, urban renewal projects seek to clear enough unsafe and 
unsanitary blight by condemning an entire area even though some buildings within the designated area may 
not be blighted.”).  But cf. Pequonnock Yacht Club, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 790 A.2d 1178, 1184 (Conn. 
2002) (holding condemnation of non-blighted property unconstitutional because “property that is not 
substandard and that is the subject of a taking within a redevelopment area must be essential to the 
redevelopment plan in order for the agency to justify its taking”).
193 See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, County of Maricopa, 671 P.2d 387, 389 (Ariz. 1983) 
(stating that it is “generally accepted” that “the taking of property in a so-called slum or blighted area for 
the purpose of clearing and ‘redevelopment,’” constitutes a “public use” even when “sale [occurs] before or 
after reconstruction to a private person or entity for operation of a public or private business”); Sinas v. 
City of Lansing, 170 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 1969) (classifying the “elimination of urban blight [a]s an 
adequate justification for the exercise of the power of eminent domain . . . even where the acquisition is 
followed by sale to private individuals”).
194 See generally James Buchanan & Craig Stubblebine, Externalities, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).
195 See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 79 (2000) (characterizing situations of “aesthetic blight” as “negative externalities imposed on 
existing homes”).
196 See Richard K. Green & Michelle J. White, Urban Abandonments: A Possible Cause and 
Consequences 15 (working paper on file with the New York University Law Review) (concluding that 
“abandonments are good predictors of negative externalities”); William T. Nachbaur, Empty Houses: 
Abandoned Buildings in the Inner City, 17 HOW. L.J. 3, 10-11 (1971) (describing how abandoned buildings 
drive away residents and owners). 
197 See Fennell, supra note 195, at 984-85 (“The case for clearing blight land is essentially a nuisance-
control rationale that hinges on the negative externalities generated by the land in its present condition.”); 
cf. Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In Berman, for example, if the slums at 
issue were truly ‘blighted,’ then state nuisance law, not the power of eminent domain, would provide the 
appropriate remedy.”).
198
 For a discussion and comparison of types of legal rules for controlling externalities, see SHAVELL, 
supra note 17, at 92-101.
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The imposition of liability would allow affected homeowners to bring suit against the 
owners of the blighted property in order to provide a financial incentive to reduce 
harmful externalities.  In the context of eminent domain, however, such a solution seems 
problematic because the dispersed victims of blight (who may be difficult to identify in 
the first place) usually will not have a financial incentive to bring suit against the 
property owner creating the externality, who may also be judgment proof.  Similarly, 
corrective taxes—fines paid to the state in the amount of expected harm—would be 
infeasible because the owners of blighted property may not have enough money to pay 
for the damage inflicted by the blight.  A subsidy, while potentially useful for positive 
externalities,199 would be problematic for negative externalities because a subsidy would 
create a moral hazard problem.  Specifically, existing owners could opportunistically 
impose blight externalities on their neighbors in order to receive a government subsidy.200
A negative externality, however, also could be resolved through private
bargaining.201 If a blighted property is imposing negative externalities on surrounding 
areas, the affected owners could bargain with the owner of the blighted property to
eliminate the blight-causing condition or to purchase the blighted property. But
bargaining with the existing owner to eliminate blight is unlikely to be successful.  The 
transactions costs of organizing all affected property owners are likely to be prohibitive, 
especially because existing owners would have an incentive to free ride off of their 
neighbors.  Moreover, convincing the owner to sell his property may also be difficult.  If 
a private developer seeks to assemble several blighted parcels for a new project, the hold-
out problem would once again inhibit bargaining. As a result, secret purchases might be 
necessary to overcome the negative externalities caused by blight.
Applying the foregoing economic analysis to Berman v. Parker, 202 the theory
seems to cut in two different directions.  On the one hand, the main drawback of eminent 
domain—i.e., mistakenly taking land from its highest-valued user—is less problematic 
because the blighted land is vacant or unproductive.  Existing owners are thus less likely 
to attach sentimental or idiosyncratic value to these properties.203 On the other hand, the 
counterarguments against secret buying agents seem weaker than in the case of economic 
development.  The problem of unwilling sellers is less likely to occur with blighted 
properties than with properties with an existing use.  Furthermore, distrust and resentment 
seem less likely because owners of blighted properties usually do not have sentimental or 
idiosyncratic attachment to their property.  Thus, while eminent domain is unlikely to 
cause socially undesirable transactions in the context of blight, secret buying agents are 
equally effective for overcoming the holdout problem.
199 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
200 See Fennell, supra note 195, at 985 (“If the use is inflicting costs on the surrounding area, then the 
owner under ordinary market conditions might well be able to hold out for a large share of the surplus that 
will be delivered from the discontinuance of the use.  But . . . [t]he incentives for extortionate behavior are 
clear enough if people are allowed to create bad situations and then glean some of the surplus associated 
with relieving the negative condition.”).
201
 For a discussion of the possibility of resolving externalities through bargaining, see SHAVELL, supra
note 17, at 101-09.
202
 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
203 See Fennell, supra note 195, at 985 (“[T]he owners of blighted land are unlikely to enjoy any 
significant (legitimate) subjective premium.  To the extent the land is worth more to these owners than fair 
market value, we might say that the surplus arises from a willingness to offload costs onto neighbors and 
tenants, rather than from any affirmative, site-specific investments in the community.”).
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However, an unusual type of corruption exists in the context of blight that makes
secret purchases preferable to eminent domain.  If a state law prohibits economic
development as a public use, a city may use a blight designation as a pretext for using 
eminent domain for economic development.  In these situations, the blight designation 
often includes productive businesses and inhabited homes with no obvious characteristics 
of blight.
For example, in Gamble v. City of Norwood,204 the city council designed a $125-
million project for upscale retail and luxury condominiums that would require ousting
seventy-seven families.205  The council labeled the neighborhood as “deteriorating” and 
threatened a blight designation, even though the neighborhood’s middle-class homes 
were well-kept and typically sold for more than $100,000.206 Similarly, in Lakewood, 
Ohio, a real estate developer planned to assemble land for 200 condominiums.207  Sixty-
six existing colonial homes were deemed blighted,208 even though, under the relevant 
criteria (which included the lack of a two-car attached garage), the homes of the mayor 
and entire city council would also have been blighted.209 Overall, using blight as a 
pretext for economic development has become increasingly common.210
In these cases, a pretextual doctrinal label in a municipal ordinance or statute
should not alter the underlying functional analysis.211 Unlike cases involving actual 
blight, cases involving pretextual blight do not involve a negative externality.  As a 
result, buying agents can purchase property in these case just as they can in cases 
involving the assembly of multiple properties for economic development.  In contrast, the 
use of eminent domain could cause a socially undesirable transfer. Furthermore, all 
instances of pretextual blight are essentially instances of corruption because the 
municipality or corporation attempts to condemn property on the basis of blight, even 
204 No. C-040019, 2004 WL 1948690 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. Sept. 3, 2004).
205 See BERLINER, supra note 8, at 167.
206 See Susan Vela, Threatened Homeowners Ask: What is Blight?, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, at 1A 
(Dec. 23, 2002).
207 See BERLINER, supra note 8, at 165.
208 Id. at 166.
209 See 60 Minutes Story, Eminent Domain (Sept. 28, 2003) (“Using the [statutory] criteria means that 
more than 90 percent of the houses in Lakewood could be deemed blighted—including the mayor’s house 
and every one of the city council members.”).
210 See, e.g., BERLINER, supra note 8, at 82-83 (“In Kentucky, a neighborhood with $200,000 homes is 
blighted.  Englewood, New Jersey, termed an industrial park blighted that had one unoccupied building out 
of 37 and generated $1.2 million per year in property taxes. . . . And various California cities have tried to 
label neighborhoods blighted for peeling paint and uncut lawns.”); see also Colin Gordon, Blighting the 
Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 305, 307 (2004) (pointing out that the concept of blight has become mere “legal pretext”).
211 See Fennell, supra note 195, at 986 (“If government is given unlimited power to decide what counts as 
‘blight’ or what sorts of uses are subnormal, then it can characterize any failure to confer a benefit in these 
terms. . . . Given the inherent malleability of the line between stopping a landowner from harming others 
and forcing a landowner to provide a benefit to others, a simple assertion of ‘blight’ or the casting of an 
exercise of eminent domain in harm-preventing rhetoric cannot be sufficient to bring it within this 
nuisance-prevention rule.”).
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though it could not have condemned the property for the purpose of economic 
development.212
Overall, secret buying agents work just as well as eminent domain in eliminating 
the negative externalities of actual blight and are a better mechanism in cases involving 
pretextual blight.  The use of eminent domain should therefore be disfavored in all cases
of asserted blight.
C.  Instrumentalities and Utilities
Finally, while secret purchases are an effective mechanism for assembling land 
for promoting economic development and eliminating urban blight, secret buying agents 
are actually ineffective in certain other circumstances.  Specifically, secret agents are 
ineffective for assembling land for both the instrumentalities of commerce (e.g., 
railroads, canals, or private highways) and private utility operations (e.g., telephone lines, 
oil pipes, or electric wires).  Both of these uses require long, thin, and continuous pieces 
of land that are difficult to assemble without being detected.  If, for example, Amtrak 
attempts to lay railroad track or Commonwealth Edison attempts to lay utility lines, the 
secrecy of such a project is difficult (if not impossible) to maintain even through secret 
buying agents. However, because these situations have long been considered public uses 
(even while including private transfers), these exceptions further illustrate the relevance 
of secret agents for distinguishing between public and private uses.
The use of eminent domain traditionally has been allowed for aggregating thin, 
continuous pieces of land even for private parties for primarily private objectives. Courts
have upheld the transfer of property for both the instrumentalities of commerce and 
private utility companies.  For example, the United States Supreme Court and courts in 
every state have upheld the use of eminent domain for acquiring property for laying 
railroad track.213 Likewise, the use of eminent has been upheld for digging irrigation 
ditches and canals, piping oil, distributing artificial light and power, laying telephone 
wires, and laying coaxial cable and fiber optic lines.214
Courts have upheld these uses of eminent domain because the “very existence” of 
these projects depends on government coordination.215 In these circumstances the 
probability of public knowledge of the project is likely to be so high that even secret 
agents could not prevent the holdout problem. As the Michigan Supreme Court stated in 
Hathcock:
212 Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005) (“Nor would the City be 
allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow 
a private benefit.”).
213 See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992); Hairston v. 
Danville and Western R.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908); Baltimore & S. R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395 
(1850)); see also NICHOLS (citing cases from all fifty states upholding use of eminent domain to lay railroad 
track).
214 See Albert Hanson Lumber Co., Ltd. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 581 (1923) (digging irrigation ditches and 
canals); Walker v. Gateway Pipeline Company, 601 So. 2d 970 (Ala. 1992) (piping oil); Alabama Electric 
Cooperative, Inc. v. Jones, 674 So. 2d 734 (Ala. 1990) (distributing artificial light and power); Buncombe 
Metallic Tel. Co. v. McGinnis, 109 N.E. 257 (Ill. 1915) (laying telephone wires); Cablevision of the 
Midwest v. Gross, 639 N.E.2d 1154 (Ohio St. 3d 1994) (laying coaxial cable and fiber optic lines).
215
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., 
dissenting).
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[A] corporation constructing a railroad . . . must lay track so that it forms a 
more or less straight path from point A to point B.  If a property owner 
between points A and B holds out—say, for example, by refusing to sell 
his land for any amount less than fifty times its appraised value—the 
construction of the railroad is halted unless and until the railroad accedes 
to the property owner’s demands.  And if owners of adjoining properties 
receive word of the original property owner’s windfall, they too will 
refuse to sell.216
The almost inevitable dissemination of information about the path of a proposed project 
thus causes a holdout problem for the developer, for whom it will be economically 
infeasible to abandon the existing route.217 Because maintaining the secrecy of these 
projects would be virtually impossible, secret purchases would be unable to overcome the 
holdout problem.218 As a result, these transactions require the use of eminent domain.219
However, these types of takings have long been considered to be constitutionally 
legitimate public uses even though they involved the transfer of property from one 
private owner to another.220  That is, the use of secret agents is infeasible in precisely the 
areas where eminent domain traditionally has been used in private transfers.  Thus, rather 
than undermining the secret-agent theory, these exceptions ultimately provide further 
evidence that the feasibility (or infeasibility) of secret buying agents provides a useful 
mechanism for distinguishing between public and private uses.221
216
 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d 765, 781-82 (Mich. 2004); cf. Dayton Mining Co. v. 
Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 411 (1876) (“A railroad, to be successfully operated must be constructed upon the 
most feasible and direct route; it cannot run around the land of every individual who refuses to dispose of 
his private property upon reasonable terms.”).
217 See Crafton, supra note 116, at 872-73 (“[A]s soon as information that a railroad has begun to build 
its line becomes available to individuals who lie in the proposed railroad’s path, these individuals have the 
ability to hold out for a price that exceeds the alternate value of the land.  Such a position is possible 
because the cost of the railroad of abandoning the line and switching to an alternative route becomes 
prohibitive once construction has commenced.”).
218 Cf. id. (noting but “ignor[ing] the possibility that the railroad may keep the proposed route secret or 
engage in other strategic behavior to avoid site monopoly problems”).
219 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782 (“The likelihood that property owners will engage in this tactic 
makes the acquisition of property for railroads, gas lines, highways, and other such ‘instrumentalities of 
commerce’ a logistical and practical nightmare. Accordingly, this Court has held that the exercise of 
eminent domain in such cases—in which collective action is needed to acquire land for vital 
instrumentalities of commerce—is consistent with the constitutional ‘public use’ requirement.”); Poletown, 
304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (“With regard to highways, railroads, canals, and other 
instrumentalities of commerce, it takes little imagination to recognize that without eminent domain these 
essential improvements, all of which require particular configurations of property narrow and generally 
straight ribbons of land would be ‘otherwise impracticable’; they would not exist at all.”); see also Crafton, 
supra note 116, at 872-73 (“The ability of sellers to ‘hold up’ buyers and charge right of way based 
monopoly rents seems to play an important role in the instrumentality of commerce cases and explains why 
courts have upheld condemnation for private roads, irrigation ditches, and sanitation purposes.”).
220 See supra notes 213-14.
221
 Private parties regularly attempt to use eminent domain in several other situations.  In a working 
paper, I apply the foregoing analysis regarding secret purchases and private influence to a number of other 
circumstances: (i) the dilemma of landlocked property; (ii) the utilization of unique property; (iii) the 
expansion of existing facilities; (iv) and the redistribution of land.  The dilemma of landlocked property 
involves a landlocked property owner who seeks to use eminent domain to take an easement through his 
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V.  CONCLUSION: THE NEW THEORY AND ITS ADVANTAGES
The foregoing analysis and applications demonstrate the feasibility (and indeed, 
necessity) of a new legal standard for the public use requirement.  The theory based on 
secret purchases and private influence provides this standard. Like eminent domain, the 
use of buying agents overcomes the holdout problem among strategic sellers.  But unlike 
eminent domain, the use of buying agents ensures that all transfers are socially 
desirable.222 The use of eminent domain for private parties also increases the potential 
for inordinate private influence.223 Consequently, a developer who wishes to utilize the
state’s condemnation authority must demonstrate either that a significant positive 
externality would go unrealized or that buying agents would be impracticable.224 In all 
other situations, the use of secret buying agents provides a superior mechanism for 
assembling property.  
The theory of public use based on secret purchases and private influence also 
provides an administrable standard for legislative and judicial decisionmaking. Courts 
have been reluctant to review public use determinations because of their wariness about
making cost-benefit calculations under informational uncertainty.225  As a result, most
courts, assuming that the legislature is the more appropriate branch for these
judgments,226 have deferred to almost all legislative determination s of public use.227 In
neighbor’s land for his private benefit.  See, e.g., Tolksdorf v. Griffith, 626 N.W. 2d 163 (Mich. 2001) 
(condemnation for private road).  The utilization of unique property involves the use of eminent domain to 
acquire property that is unique because of its location or idiosyncratic topographical characteristics.  See,
e.g., Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979) (condemnation for mobile 
telephone transmitter station).  The expansion of existing facilities involves the use of eminent domain 
against one’s neighbors to acquire more property for an existing use.  See, e.g., 99 Cents Only v. Lancaster 
Redevelopment Agency, No. 01-56338, 2003 WL 932421 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2003) (condemnation for 
expanding Costco warehouse).  Finally, the redistribution of land involves the use of eminent domain to 
create more equitable land ownership or to prevent an oligopoly.  See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (condemnations for transferring property from landlords to tenants).  These 
variations, which remain relatively unexplored, suggest further extensions of the secret-agent theory for 
future inquiry.   
222 See supra Part. III.A.
223 See supra Part III.B.
224 See supra Part III.C.1 and Part IV.C.
225 See General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997) (characterizing the Court as “institutionally 
unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made,” “professionally untrained to 
make them,” and consequently “reticent to engage in elaborate analysis of real-world economic effects”); 
United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946) (stating that “courts deciding on what is and 
is not a governmental function” is “a practice which has proved impracticable in other fields”); see also
NICHOLS § 7.08[3] (“How one can assess the relative weights of public need versus private rights is quite 
subjective . . . . It would simply lead to judges second guessing legislative cost/benefit calculations 
(through a return to heightened scrutiny) and [there is] no reason why the latter’s judgments should 
prevail.”).
226 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (declining to “second-
guess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan”); Schweiker v. Wilson, 
450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (characterizing the legislature as “the appropriate representative body through 
which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems”); 
see also Garnett, supra note 131, at 962  (“Judicial deference to a decision to exercise eminent-domain 
power is predicated on the assumption that the elected branches of government are in a better position than 
the courts to determine what uses of land are in the ‘public interest,’ and, moreover, that the elected 
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contrast, the new theory provides an intelligible principle for both legislative and judicial 
decisionmaking because the limitations on public use are determined through voluntary
exchanges.  Neither legislatures nor courts must project anticipated benefits, calculate
sentimental losses, or rely on uncertain cost-benefit determinations.228 Requiring
voluntary transactions through buying agents thus avoids a reliance on excessive 
centralized planning by government officials who not only lack perfect information but
also are subject to private influence.229
Moreover, the new theory is consistent with the constitutional text—“nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”230—because, as 
explained above, the use of eminent domain for private parties actually provides no 
additional “public benefit.” In many instances the use of eminent domain for private 
transfers actually decreases overall social welfare by allowing transactions in which the 
existing owners value the property more highly than the private assembler. In contrast,
the secret-agent mechanism enables a transaction if and only if the transaction is mutually 
beneficial and therefore in the public interest (i.e., for a “public use”). 231
Finally, the new theory is also consistent with actual practice.  The theory is 
consistent with the traditional exceptions to the rule prohibiting condemnations for 
private objectives.  It allows eminent domain precisely where secret buying agents would 
be impracticable for aggregating land (e.g., for railroad or utilities).232 The theory is also 
consistent with current practices.  Developers frequently utilize secret agents to avoid the 
holdout problem and assemble property.233 Furthermore, the theory is applicable to a 
wide variety of situations—including promoting economic development (as in Kelo) and
eliminating urban blight (as in Berman).234
Because of its superiority over the status quo, the theory of public use based on 
secret purchases and private influence also serves as a mechanism for reforming eminent 
domain law.  First, the theory is useful for legislative decisionmaking with regard to both
drafting statutory language and determining whether to use eminent domain for specific 
private projects.235  As the majority in Kelo states, arguments that the need for eminent 
domain has been exaggerated because private developers can use other mechanisms 
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including “secret negotiations” are “certainly matters of legitimate public debate.”236
Second, in the wake of Kelo, litigation over the scope of the public use requirement will 
increasingly move to state courts.237 Currently, more states disallow the use of eminent 
domain for private economic development than explicitly allow this use,238 but many
other state courts are likely to consider this same issue over the next several years.239
And third, the possibility of Kelo being reconsidered (and possibly overruled) is neither
implausible nor unlikely (especially in light of the Court’s five-to-four decision).  Indeed, 
the unanimous overruling of Poletown in Hathcock signaled the possibility of judicial 
reconsideration of whether economic development constitutes a legitimate public use.
Finally, even after Kelo, the limitations of the Public Use Clause are still 
relatively indeterminate because the Court did not enunciate a test for interpreting the 
public use requirement.240 The Court did maintain that a city would violate the Public 
Use Clause by taking land for a private party or for a private benefit.241 Likewise, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion proposed heightened scrutiny for a taking involving
private favoritism—a suggestion that seems to acknowledge the concern for inordinate 
private influence.242 But both the majority and Justice Kennedy left unanswered the 
question of how courts determine when a taking becomes too private and thus when a 
taking can no longer be considered a public use.243
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By contrast, the theory based on secret purchases and private influence indicates 
those circumstances in which eminent domain provides no public benefit. The feasibility
of secret buying agents in most circumstances makes the use of eminent domain for 
private parties not only unnecessary but also socially undesirable. Takings for private 
parties also create the potential for inordinate private influence as private actors have a 
socially perverse incentive to acquire eminent domain to obtain a concentrated benefit 
without bearing a project’s costs.  But because of the nature of democratic deliberation
and the fact that most public projects are known in advance, the state cannot use buying 
agents and instead must rely on eminent domain for public takings.  These takings for the 
general public are also less subject to private influence.  The new theory thus provides a 
way of distinguishing between public and private uses.
Overall, therefore, the theory of “public use” based on the role of secret buying 
agents and the potential for inordinate private influence provides a superior mechanism 
for both legislative and judicial decisionmaking.  The theory offers a coherent and 
administrable approach for interpreting the public use requirement—an issue about which 
courts have often lamented that there is “no agreement, either in reasoning or 
conclusion.”244 Future empirical work is necessary to confirm the feasibility of buying 
agents in various applications.245 This empirical work will become ever more relevant as 
private parties increasingly recognize the effectiveness of (and thus increasingly utilize)
these agents. At the very least, however, the foregoing analysis hopefully has 
demonstrated that further efforts at providing a definition of public use are not
necessarily “doomed to fail.”246
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